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ABSTRACT 
  The Americans with Disabilities Act explicitly excludes 
“compulsive gambling” from its definition of disability, thus denying 
gambling addicts protection from employer discrimination based on 
their disorder. Since the enactment of the ADA, however, scientific 
understandings of gambling disorder have evolved to view the 
condition as an addiction, rather than as a compulsion or impulse-
control disorder. This move is mirrored in the DSM-5’s 
reclassification of gambling disorder under the category of 
“substance-related and other addictive disorders.” 
  This Note contends that gambling disorder would qualify as a 
“disability” under the ADA, were it not for the disorder’s current 
statutory exclusion. This Note therefore recommends that the ADA be 
amended to bring gambling disorder within its coverage. Such a 
change would not only reflect recent developments in the field of 
addiction psychology, but would also further the ADA’s underlying 
purpose—to protect individuals with disabilities from workplace 
discrimination. 
INTRODUCTION 
By 2005, John Trammell was $30,000 in debt to the Las Vegas 
Stardust Hotel and Casino.1 Although he “had gambled all his life,” 
Trammell’s habits grew more pronounced and “aggressive[]” as his 
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 1. Steve Green, Gamblers Strike Out in Suits Tied to Las Vegas Casino Markers, LAS 
VEGAS SUN (Feb. 4, 2011, 2:05 AM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2011/feb/04/gamblers-
strike-out-suits-over-las-vegas-casino-ma. 
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marriage ended and his depression worsened.2 In 2007, while 
investigating a serious car accident involving Trammel, Arizona 
police discovered a warrant for Trammel’s arrest arising from his 
unpaid debts to the Stardust.3 At the time, Trammell was employed as 
a senior manager by the Raytheon Company, an American defense 
contractor and weapons manufacturer.4 When he returned to work 
after his arrest, Trammell met with Raytheon’s human-resources 
department to discuss his gambling problem.5 Initially, Raytheon’s 
human-resources personnel offered Trammell professional 
counseling.6 At a meeting just a few days later, Raytheon fired 
Trammell despite his expressed willingness to seek help.7 
John Trammell’s story is not unique; he is only one of an 
estimated six to eight million Americans with problematic gambling 
habits.8 Whether they wager on roulette, horse races, or lottery 
scratch cards,9 “problem gamblers” are individuals whose betting 
habits cause disruptions in their lives.10 When problematic gambling 
habits become “persistent and recurrent” and “lead[] to clinically 
significant impairment or distress,” they rise to the level of “gambling 
disorder,” a diagnosable addiction listed in the most recent edition of 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5).11  
 
 2. Trammell v. Raytheon Missile Sys., 721 F. Supp. 2d 876, 876–77 (D. Ariz. 2010). 
 3. Id. at 877. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See Help & Treatment FAQ, NAT’L COUNCIL ON PROBLEM GAMBLING, 
http://www.ncpgambling.org/help-treatment/faq (last visited Jan. 23, 2015) (estimating 
populations of four to six million adults with problematic gambling habits and another two 
million adults whose gambling patterns are sufficiently severe to meet the criteria for 
pathological gambling disorder). For autobiographical accounts of other gambling addicts, see 
SAM SKOLNIK, HIGH STAKES: THE RISING COST OF AMERICA’S GAMBLING ADDICTION i–xxvi 
(2011); see generally MARY SOJOURNER, SHE BETS HER LIFE: A TRUE STORY OF GAMBLING 
ADDICTION (2010). 
 9. The meaning of “gambling,” as used in this Note, generally adheres to a broad range of 
any activities in which money is risked. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 793 (10th ed. 2014) 
(defining gambling as “[t]he act of risking something of value, esp. money, for a chance to win a 
prize”). 
 10. Help & Treatment FAQ, supra note 8. 
 11. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 585 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5]. Although previous editions of the DSM 
had been enumerated with Roman numerals, the switch to Arabic numbers in the fifth edition 
was a deliberate move by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) to allow for incremental 
updates to the manual to be designated with decimals. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, Frequently 
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Just as Trammell saw a significant increase in the frequency of 
his gambling during a period of stress, people with gambling disorder 
often use betting as a way to cope with negative feelings of stress, 
anxiety, guilt, and depression.12 Continued reliance on gambling as a 
coping mechanism can magnify the addiction: once a preoccupation 
with gambling places a strain on a person’s finances, relationships, or 
job, the stress resulting from that strain may drive that person to 
gamble even more frequently.13 In fact, excessive-gambling behavior 
is associated with higher rates of divorce, bankruptcy, homelessness, 
and suicide.14 Due to the circular nature of gambling addicts’ 
dependence, efforts by gambling addicts to quit or reduce their 
gambling often prove unsuccessful, leaving the gamblers, like 
Trammell, out of luck.15  
The individual gambler is not the only person harmed by 
gambling disorder. Gambling addictions also impose large costs on 
society.16 According to a 2004 calculation, the estimated social costs 
associated with gambling in the United States range from $32.4 billion 
 
Asked Questions, DSM-5 DEV., http://www.dsm5.org/about/Pages/faq.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 
2015). 
 12. See Brian Castellani, Is Pathological Gambling Really a Problem? You Bet!, 
PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, (Feb. 1, 2001), available at http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/articles/
pathological-gambling-really-problem-you-bet (“Gambling becomes a coping mechanism, a way 
of dealing with the world. For these people, gambling provides an opportunity to ‘be in action,’ 
‘numb out’ and escape their problems.”); Richard A. McCormick, The Importance of Coping 
Skill Enhancement in the Treatment of the Pathological Gambler, 10 J. GAMBLING STUD. 77, 78 
(1994) (discussing gambling as “an escape avoidance coping response” to a triggering event that 
produces “sadness, frustration and perhaps anxiety”). 
 13. See Castellani, supra note 12 (noting that problem gamblers “get trapped in a vicious 
cycle of gambling to cope and coping to gamble. Now, not only are they suffering from the 
problems that started them gambling in the first place . . . , but they are also dealing with the 
negative consequences of their gambling”). 
 14. NAT’L COUNCIL ON PROBLEM GAMBLING, PROBLEM GAMBLERS AND THEIR 
FINANCES 6 (2000), available at http://www.ncpgambling.org/files/public/problem_gamblers_
finances.pdf. 
 15. See Gambling Disorders Fact Sheet, AM. GAMING ASS’N, http://www.americangaming
.org/industry-resources/research/fact-sheets/gambling-disorders (last visited Jan. 23, 2015) 
(estimating that two-thirds of gambling addicts are unable to recover without seeking or 
accepting formal treatment). 
 16. Looking solely at illicit drug, alcohol, and tobacco addictions, addictions cost society 
over $500 billion annually. Addiction Science: From Molecules to Managed Care, NAT’L INST. 
ON DRUG ABUSE, http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/addiction-science-molecules-to-
managed-care/introduction/drug-abuse-costs-united-states-economy-hundreds-billions-dollars-
in-increased-health (last updated July, 2008). 
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to $53.8 billion annually.17 A portion of this can be directly attributed 
to problematic gambling habits.18 Gambling addictions result in a less 
productive workforce—gambling addicts frequently lose their jobs, 
and employed gambling addicts are more often absent from work 
than their unafflicted peers.19 Gambling addictions also burden social-
services systems through unemployment, put social and financial 
pressure on the addicts’ families, and increase the rates of certain 
crimes.20 These high costs demonstrate that society has a strong 
interest in rehabilitating individuals with gambling disorder. 
But controversy may arise when gambling addicts’ attempts to 
receive treatment for their condition come into conflict with their 
employment obligations. The inpatient and residential treatment 
programs recommended to many gambling addicts require substantial 
time spent away from work.21 Group-therapy meetings like Gamblers 
Anonymous may require flexible work scheduling.22 Aside from 
scheduling difficulties, gambling addicts may be reluctant to reveal 
their problems at work, fearing a potential backlash from their 
employers and fellow employees. When individuals with other 
addictive disorders face these difficulties, the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA)23 offers them protections. 
After losing his job, John Trammell sued his employer for 
wrongful termination under the ADA.24 In his complaint, Trammell 
claimed depression as a disability,25 but made no attempt to claim his 
 
 17. EARL L. GRINOLS, GAMBLING IN AMERICA: COSTS AND BENEFITS 176 (2004). These 
social costs outweigh the benefits of the gambling industry “by a factor of about 3 to 1.” Earl L. 
Grinols, Too Many Negative Side Effects to Online Gambling, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 
2010, 3:28 P.M.), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/07/29/should-internet-gambling-
be-legalized/too-many-negative-side-effects-to-online-gambling.  
 18. See generally Douglas M. Walker & A.H. Barnett, The Social Costs of Gambling: An 
Economic Perspective, 15 J. GAMBLING STUD. 181 (1999) (aggregating several different 
estimates of the social costs imposed by pathological gamblers). 
 19. GRINOLS, supra note 17, at 176. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See HANDBOOK OF ADDICTIVE DISORDERS 182–86 (Robert H. Coombs ed., 2004) 
(discussing the risks and benefits of inpatient treatment for gambling problems and the 
circumstances that require inpatient treatment). 
 22. Gamblers Anonymous meetings are frequently scheduled in the evenings and on 
weekends to accommodate traditional work schedules. However, not all gambling addicts will 
have traditional work schedules. See U.S. Meetings, GAMBLERS ANONYMOUS, http://www
.gamblersanonymous.org/ga/locations (last visited Jan. 23, 2015). 
 23. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012). 
 24. Complaint at 4, Trammell v. Raytheon Missile Sys., 721 F. Supp. 2d 876 (D. Ariz. 2010) 
(No. 4:08-cv-338). 
 25. Id. at 2. 
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gambling disorder as a disability26 even though he had received a 
formal diagnosis of pathological gambling in September 2007.27 This 
glaring gap in his pleadings likely did not result from an oversight, but 
reflects the reality that such a claim is currently untenable because the 
ADA explicitly excludes “compulsive gambling” from its definition of 
disability.28 Even though Trammell’s employer had knowledge of his 
gambling problems, because he had no provable knowledge of his 
depression, Trammell could not establish a prima facie case for 
discrimination.29 Therefore, his claim failed at the summary-judgment 
stage.30 
In the twenty-four years since the enactment of the ADA, the 
scientific understanding of excessive gambling as a mental disorder 
has greatly evolved. Changes in its name and psychiatric classification 
mirror a new understanding that excessive gambling can be viewed as 
an addiction, instead of a compulsion.31 This is not merely a difference 
of semantics, but a significant alteration in how clinicians understand 
the manifestation and persistence of excessive-gambling habits as a 
mental disorder. Therefore, although the language of the ADA 
specifically refers to “compulsive gambling,”32 and many older sources 
refer to “pathological gambling,”33 this Note will use the modern 
diagnostic language of “gambling disorder” and “gambling 
addiction,” and will refer to individuals with a gambling disorder as 
“gambling addicts.” The terms “problem gambling” and “excessive 
gambling” used in this Note refer to a broader spectrum of gambling 
behaviors that encompasses, but is not limited to, full-blown gambling 
disorder.34 
 
 26. See id. at 2–4 (alleging depression, mental illness, emotional distress, anxiety, and 
stress, but not problem gambling). 
 27. Affidavit of Bradley R. Johnson, M.D. at 2, Trammell, 721 F. Supp. 2d 876 (No. 4:08-cv-
338). 
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(2) (2012). 
 29. Trammell, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 882–83. 
 30. Id. 
 31. For a discussion of the evolving scientific understanding of gambling disorder, see infra 
Part II. 
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 12211. 
 33. See generally CHRISTINE REILLY & NATHAN SMITH, THE EVOLVING DEFINITION OF 
PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING IN THE DSM-5 (2013), available at http://www.ncrg.org/sites/
default/files/uploads/docs/white_papers/ncrg_wpdsm5_may2013.pdf (discussing the shift in 
preferred nomenclature for gambling disorder). 
 34. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text. 
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Despite the changes to the scientific understanding of excessive-
gambling behaviors, the ADA’s exclusion of compulsive gambling 
remains the law. This exclusion deprives individuals with gambling 
disorder of the same protections that the ADA affords to individuals 
with psychiatrically similar addictions like alcoholism and drug 
dependency.35 Because the ADA’s definition of disability serves a 
gatekeeping role in courts’ determination of disability-discrimination 
claims, this Note calls for an amendment to the ADA eliminating the 
exclusion of compulsive gambling. 
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part I provides a summary of 
the provisions and history of the ADA. Part II details the 
psychological underpinnings of addiction theory and recent 
developments in the psychiatric and psychological research of 
excessive-gambling behaviors. Part III discusses problems with the 
exclusion of compulsive gambling as a legally cognizable disability 
under the ADA. Part IV addresses potential challenges to recognition 
of addictive-gambling disorder as a disability. Part V analyzes how 
John Trammel’s case would have been decided if the ADA had 
allowed a gambling-based disability. This Note concludes by 
advocating for an amendment to the ADA to remove the current 
exclusion of compulsive gambling and to allow for the recognition of 
addictive-gambling disorder as a disability. 
I.  THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
A. The ADA’s Enactment and Purpose 
Congress enacted the ADA in 199036 to eliminate discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities.37 Although the Rehabilitation 
Act38 had been passed previously to prohibit discrimination on the 
basis of disability in the employment practices of federal agencies and 
certain federal contractors, the ADA expanded these protections into 
the private arena. Lawmakers were focused on the “isolate[d]” and 
 
 35. See infra Part III.C. 
 36. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012)). Despite the fanfare accompanying its passage, 
the ADA was not the first piece of federal legislation intended to protect the rights of people 
with disabilities. See, e.g., Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–796 (2012) (prohibiting 
federal agencies, federal contractors, and recipients of federal funds from discriminating against 
people with disabilities).  
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2012). 
 38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–796 (2012). 
WADE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/26/2015  11:39 PM 
2015] GAMBLING DISORDER UNDER THE ADA 953 
“segregate[d]” social positions occupied by people with disabilities 
that cause them to be “severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, 
economically, and educationally.”39 In light of the lawmakers’ voiced 
rationale, the ADA was touted as an “emancipation proclamation for 
the disabled.”40 
One of the driving goals behind the legislation was to combat the 
“barriers of ignorance, prejudice, and inaccessibility” that prevent 
people with disabilities from entering the labor pool.41 To this end, 
Title I of the ADA42 establishes rules for employers’ treatment of 
individuals with disabilities that “make it possible for [them] to lead 
productive lives.”43 Title I prohibits covered employers from 
discriminating against “qualified individuals”44 on the basis of 
disability.45 The provisions of Title I not only limit the scope of 
allowable employer actions, but also impose an affirmative obligation 
on employers to provide “reasonable accommodations” to employees 
with disabilities.46 This reasonable-accommodation requirement was 
intended to create employment opportunities that would have been 
 
 39. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2), (6) (2012). 
 40. 135 CONG. REC. 19,888 (1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); see also 136 CONG. REC. 
17,369 (1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (arguing that the ADA is “an emancipation 
proclamation for persons with disabilities”).  
 41. 135 CONG. REC. H5065 (1989) (statement of Rep. Hoyer). This goal was not purely 
rights-focused, but also financially motivated. See id. (“[T]he Federal Government currently 
spends up to $75 billion . . . much of the money being spent supporting people who want to 
work.”). 
 42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117 (2012). 
 43. 135 CONG. REC. H5065 (2007) (statement of Rep. Hoyer). 
 44. “Qualified individual” is defined as “an individual who, with or without reasonable 
accommodation, can perform the essential functions” of his desired job. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 
 45. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The statute provides: “No covered entity shall discriminate 
against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, 
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and 
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” Id. 
 46. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Examples of “reasonable accommodations” include 
adjustments to existing facilities to make them accessible and usable, modified work schedules, 
reassignment, and adjustment of training material or policies. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). The 
affirmative obligation to provide reasonable accommodation distinguishes the ADA from other 
employment-discrimination statutes, with the exception of Title VII’s prohibition of 
discrimination based on religion. Compare id. (providing a list of accommodations that 
employers can make for individuals with disability that fall within the definition of “reasonable 
accommodation”), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012) (allowing employers to claim that they are 
“unable to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious observance and practice” without 
“undue hardship on the . . . employer’s business”). 
WADE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/26/2015  11:39 PM 
954 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:947 
otherwise unavailable to individuals with disabilities47 and to facilitate 
the productivity of employed individuals with disabilities by tailoring 
work environments to their needs.48  
B. Establishing a Disability and Bringing a Claim Under the ADA 
The ADA’s definition of disability plays a critical gatekeeping 
role in determining the scope of Title I’s protection. Before seeking 
any remedy for adverse employment actions under the ADA, 
individuals must first establish that they are covered under the Act by 
alleging that they have a recognized disability. Lawmakers decided 
against the creation of any conditions that would automatically 
qualify as disabilities under the ADA,49 so courts must examine claims 
of disability on a case-by-case basis.50 Under the ADA, claimants 
must establish a disability by satisfying one of three conditions: first, 
alleging “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one 
or more major life activities of such individual;”51 second, 
demonstrating “a record of such an impairment;”52 or third, “being 
 
 47. See 135 CONG. REC. S10,713 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (“The 
ADA gives power to individuals with disabilities to make choices, to decide for themselves what 
kind of life they want to lead, and provides a meaningful and effective opportunity to become 
independent and productive members of our society.”). 
 48. See, e.g., 154 CONG. REC. 19,436 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2008) (statement of Rep. Rob 
Andrews) (“There was a man who got a job with a major retail corporation . . . , and he’s 
diabetic. When he first started work, his supervisor understood that . . . he needed a special 
lunch break . . . so he could deal with his blood sugar needs and stay healthy and be 
productive.”). 
 49. See S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 20 (1989) (“It is not possible to include . . . all the specific 
conditions . . . that would constitute physical or mental impairments . . . , particularly in light of 
the fact that new disorders may develop in the future.”). More recently, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) revised its proposed regulations, which had originally 
included a list of impairments that would “consistently,” “sometimes,” or “usually not” 
constitute disabilities under the ADA, in response to criticism that the list would effectively 
create per se disabilities. Fact Sheet on the EEOC’s Final Regulations Implementing the 
ADAAA, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/regulations/
adaaa_fact_sheet.cfm (last visited Jan. 23, 2015). However, the list did include a select group of 
conditions that “virtually always constitute a disability,” like HIV, cancer, and diabetes. Id. 
 50. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641–42 (1998) (deciding not to address the 
second question presented of whether HIV is a per se disability under the ADA).  
 51. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2012). 
 52. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(B). The second “record of” prong applies when an individual “has 
a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(1) (2015). 
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regarded as having such an impairment.”53 This Note focuses on the 
first (or “actual disability”)54 prong, and how both Congress and the 
courts have shaped its terms. Though the disability requirement is 
only one of the many hurdles prospective plaintiffs must clear, the 
definition of disability is one area where courts exercise great control 
over the scope of the ADA’s protections by drawing the boundary 
lines of this provision.55 Therefore, the threshold disability 
requirement has often proved to be the determinative factor in many 
employees’ claims for relief. 
The “actual disability” prong encompasses both physical and 
mental impairments.56 Physical impairments can range from “cosmetic 
disfigurement” to physiological disorders affecting multiple body 
systems,57 and “[a]ny mental or psychological disorder”—including 
learning disabilities and mental illnesses—can qualify as a mental 
impairment.58 An impairment alone, however, is not sufficient to 
establish a disability, unless it also “substantially limit[s] a major life 
activity.”59 The ADA defines major life activities to include not only 
“caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, 
sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, 
 
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C). The third “regarded as” prong addresses employer 
perceptions of disability. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l). A person falls under the third prong of disability 
if her employer treats her as having an impairment, even if she does not. Id.  
 54. Although the ADA’s implementing regulations refer to conditions that satisfy the first 
prong of the ADA’s definition of disability as “actual” disabilities, that terminology was 
selected for ease of reference. Individuals with conditions meeting any of the three prongs are 
equally protected under the ADA. Regulations To Implement the Equal Employment 
Provisions of the Americans With Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,978 (proposed 
Mar. 25, 2011) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (2015)). 
 55. For an example of how courts may narrow the scope of the ADA, consider the series of 
cases—now largely defunct—incorporating mitigating measures into courts’ determinations of 
disabilities. See Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565 (1999) (recognizing visual 
compensation as a mitigating measure for monocular vision), and Murphy v. United Parcel 
Serv., 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999) (recognizing medication as a mitigating measure for blood 
pressure); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 488–89 (1999) (recognizing glasses as a 
mitigating measure for myopia). For an example of boundary enlarging, see Bragdon, 524 U.S. 
at 641 (holding that asymptomatic HIV infection is a disability); see also Kevin Barry, Toward 
Universalism: What the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Can and Can’t Do for Disability Rights, 
31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 203, 206 (2010) (“The story of lower courts striking down the 
claims of people with significant medical impairments under the [ADA] because they are not 
‘disabled’ is a familiar one in legal scholarship.”). 
 56. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). 
 57. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (2015). 
 58. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2). 
 59. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). 
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learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and 
working” but also maintaining “major bodily functions.”60 
Consider a woman with a form of muscular dystrophy who has 
lost the use of her legs and thus requires the use of a wheelchair. 
Although her use of a wheelchair alone does not establish that she 
has a disability within the meaning of the ADA, courts applying the 
ADA would almost certainly recognize the woman’s physical 
condition as a disability because muscular dystrophy is a physical 
impairment affecting her muscular system, and her impairment 
substantially limits a major life activity—namely, her ability to walk.61 
The ADA’s definition of disability is not limited to physical 
conditions, but also explicitly states that mental impairments can 
qualify as disabilities.62 A number of cases have recognized 
depression, generalized-anxiety disorder, and other mental conditions 
as disabilities.63 Among the potentially covered mental impairments 
contemplated by lawmakers at the time the ADA was passed, 
alcoholism and drug addiction were openly discussed and included in 
the statutory language.64 The legislative discussion and statutory 
inclusion support the contention that they meet the requirements of a 
disability. Even though both conditions qualify under the ADA, 
Congress has noted that both substance-abuse disorders are subject to 
special restrictions.65 
 
 60. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)–(B). 
 61. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 62. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A); see EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE AMERICANS 
WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, NO. 915.002, at 2–3 (1997) (listing as 
examples of emotional or mental illness “major depression, bipolar disorder, [and] anxiety 
disorders”). 
 63. See, e.g., Whalen v. City of Syracuse, No. 5:11-cv-794, 2014 WL 3529976, at *6 
(N.D.N.Y. July 15, 2014) (“Here, Plaintiff’s anxiety and depression clearly satisfy the actual 
disability prong under the ADAAA.”); Owens v. City of Barnsdell, No. 13-cv-749, 2014 WL 
2197798, at *3 (N.D. Okla. May 27, 2014) (finding it “plausible that Plaintiff’s depression and 
anxiety could limit a major life activity”); Cody v. Cnty. Nassau, 577 F. Supp. 2d 623, 638 
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (acknowledging that generalized-anxiety disorder has been recognized as an 
impairment under the ADA (citing Reeves v. Johnson Controls, 140 F.3d 298, 312 (2d Cir. 
1999))). 
 64. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. S19,900 (1989) (emphasizing Congressional intent “to protect 
applicants and employees who have overcome or are successfully being treated for drug or 
alcohol problems.”); S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 20–21 (1989) (“The term [mental impairment] 
includes . . . drug addiction and alcoholism.”). 
 65. 42 U.S.C. § 12114 (2012). For a discussion of these special restrictions, see infra Part 
IV.B. 
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Although the ADA does not designate any conditions as per se 
disabilities,66 it does include several per se exclusions of conditions as 
recognized disabilities. In 42 U.S.C. § 12211, the ADA specifically 
excludes from coverage compulsive gambling as well as 
homosexuality, bisexuality, transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, 
exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender-identity disorders, other sexual-
behavior disorders, kleptomania, pyromania, and psychoactive-
substance-abuse disorders resulting from the illegal use of drugs.67 
Commenting on the potential inclusion of conditions like compulsive 
gambling in the ADA’s coverage, one senator argued: 
A diagnosis of certain types of mental illness is frequently made on 
the basis of a pattern of socially unacceptable behavior and lacks 
any physiological basis. In short, we are talking about behavior that 
is immoral, improper, or illegal and which individuals are engaging 
in of their own volition, admittedly for reasons we do not fully 
understand. . . . In principle, I agree with the concept that the 
mentally ill should be protected from invidious discrimination just as 
the physically handicapped should be. However, people must bear 
some responsibility for the consequences of their own actions.68 
The above commentary and others like it evidence the moralistic 
nature of § 12211’s exclusions,69 colloquially referred to as the “sin 
exceptions.”70 
Due to the exclusion of compulsive gambling, an employee is 
unable to seek protection from unlawful termination and cannot 
request workplace accommodations under the ADA on the basis of 
his gambling condition. This is true regardless of whether the 
 
 66. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. 
 67. 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (2012). This Note’s argument to legitimize gambling disorder as a 
disability does not extend to all other items listed in § 12211. In fact, to characterize those listed 
items bearing on sexual orientation and gender identity as “disabilities” would be not only 
inaccurate, but offensive. However, their reference in the statutory language reflects the 
moralistic undertone of the § 12211 exclusions. For further discussion of the ADA’s treatment 
of sexual and gender identity, see generally Kevin M. Barry, Disabilityqueer: Federal Disability 
Rights Protection for Transgender People, 16 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1 (2013). 
 68. 135 CONG. REC. S19,896 (1989). 
 69. See 135 CONG. REC. S19,853 (1989) (“I could not imagine the sponsors would want to 
provide a protected legal status to somebody who has such [mental] disorders, particularly those 
[that] might have a moral content to them or which in the opinion of some people might have a 
moral content.”). 
 70. Zachary Busey, Breaking Brackets: Is Gambling on March Madness Illegal?, BAKER 
DONELSON (Mar. 25, 2014, 1:49 PM), http://www.bakerdonelson.com/l_e_compass/blog.aspx?
entry=482.  
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employee can demonstrate that his gambling condition would 
otherwise qualify under the ADA criteria as a mental impairment 
that substantially limits a major life activity and that he is, with or 
without reasonable accommodation, qualified for the job. Section 
12211 effectively bars any argument that compulsive gambling could 
be recognized by a court as a disability under the ADA. Although an 
argument could conceivably be made that compulsive gambling and 
gambling disorder are two different conditions,71 thereby removing 
gambling disorder from the realm of § 12211, present and historical 
usage of “compulsive gambling” as an equivalent for gambling 
disorder72 would likely render this argument unsuccessful. 
II.  GAMBLING AS AN ADDICTIVE BEHAVIOR 
This Part explains the development of the current scientific 
understanding of gambling as an addictive behavior. This Part first 
presents the idea of behavioral addictions in general, and then tracks 
how gambling disorder came to be considered a behavioral addiction 
through the various editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders. Lastly, this Part examines how gambling 
disorder comports with a current understanding of addiction. 
A. The Idea of Behavioral Addictions 
The concept of addiction is particularly nebulous. Despite the 
term’s long lineage,73 there is still no medical or legal consensus on 
what it means to be addicted.74 The Black’s Law Dictionary definition 
of addiction adheres to the traditional substance-based notion of 
addiction,75 but the increasingly accepted view considers substance-
 
 71. For a discussion of the shift in DSM-5 classification that distances gambling disorder 
from compulsive gambling, see infra Part II.B. 
 72. E.g., Diseases and Conditions: Compulsive Gambling, MAYO CLINIC, http://
www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/compulsive-gambling/basics/definition/con-20023242 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2015) (“Compulsive gambling, also called gambling disorder . . . .”). 
 73. The term “addiction” was used to reference the state of being dependent on a drug as 
early as 1779. Addiction, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 143 (2d ed. 1989). 
 74. Definitions Related to the Use of Opioids for the Treatment of Pain, AM. PAIN SOC’Y 1 
(2001), available at https://www.erowid.org/psychoactives/addiction/addiction_definitions1.pdf 
(“Scientists, clinicians, regulators, and the lay public use disparate definitions of terms related to 
addiction.”) For example, because the above source focuses on opioid abuse, the definition of 
addiction it recommends focuses on “impaired control over drug use.” Id. at 2. 
 75. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 43 (9th ed. 2009) (defining addiction as “[t]he habitual and 
intemperate use of a substance, esp. a potentially harmful one such as a narcotic drug.”). 
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based addictions as only one subclass of a broader field,76 which now 
includes gambling-based addictions.77 
Specifically, gambling disorder is part of a growing group of 
behavioral addictions—addictions based on an individual’s 
dependence on certain activities rather than on certain substances.78 
As with alcoholics or drug addicts, individuals with behavioral 
addictions often begin their activity of choice voluntarily, but as the 
addicts repeatedly engage in the behavior associated with the activity, 
they experience biological, psychological, and behavioral changes that 
form an addiction to the behavior, thereby inhibiting them from 
stopping.79 Because behavioral addiction and traditional addiction are 
distinguished principally by the absence of an external chemical, some 
have called behavioral addictions like gambling disorder “pure 
addiction[s].”80 
 
 76. JIM ORFORD, AN UNSAFE BET? 45 (2011). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Although other “behavioral addictions” have been identified and studied, this Note is 
arguing only for the inclusion of gambling disorder in the ADA’s coverage because gambling 
disorder is the only carve-out with enough scientific research to solidly support its classification 
as an addictive disorder. See DSM-5, supra note 11, at 481 (“Other excessive behavioral patterns 
. . . have also been described, but the research on these and other behavioral syndromes is less 
clear. Thus [other behavioral addictions] are not included [in DSM-5] because . . . there is 
insufficient peer-reviewed evidence to establish the diagnostic criteria and course descriptions 
needed to identify these . . . as mental disorders.”). Additionally, this Note will not address 
whether any of the other items listed in § 12211, or any of the other conditions listed in the 
DSM-IV’s “impulse-control disorders not otherwise classified” category, should be considered 
behavioral disorders. See Jon E. Grant, Marc N. Potenza, Aviv Weinstein & David A. Gorelick, 
Introduction to Behavioral Addictions, 36 AM. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE 233, 233–34 (2010) 
(“Not all impulse control disorders, or disorders characterized by impulsivity, should be 
considered behavioral addictions.”). Ultimately, this Note neither supports nor forecloses the 
future possibility of other conditions excluded under § 12211 entering ADA coverage. 
 79. See Alan I. Leshner, Addiction is a Brain Disease, 17 ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. ONLINE 
75, 76 (2001) (“[T]he recognition that addiction is a brain disease . . . explain[s] why an addict 
cannot simply stop using drugs by sheer force of will alone.”). 
 80. Joseph W. Ciarrochi, Neil M. Kirschner & Fred Fallik, Personality Dimensions of Male 
Pathological Gamblers, Alcoholics, and Dually Addicted Gamblers, 7 J. GAMBLING STUD. 133, 
134 (1991); see PETER FERENTZY & NIGEL E. TURNER, THE HISTORY OF PROBLEM 
GAMBLING 37 (2013) (noting that the phrase “pure addiction” is used “because of the absence 
of a potentially harmful substance or any brain damage that might occur from the drug,” and 
that “the changes seen in a person [with gambling addiction] are the result of the addiction and 
not a side effect of the substance itself”); Alex Blaszczynski & Lia Nower, Research and 
Measurement Issues in Gambling Studies: Etiological Models, in RESEARCH AND 
MEASUREMENT ISSUES IN GAMBLING STUDIES 323, 335 (Garry Smith, David C. Hodgins & 
Robert J. Williams eds., 2007) (noting that gambling addiction is “an addiction without [a] 
drug”). 
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B. The Treatment of Excessive Gambling as a Mental Disorder in the 
DSM 
1. Gambling as an Impulse-Control Disorder in DSM-III and 
DSM-IV.  The act of gambling has not always been considered an 
addictive behavior.81 In fact, excessive gambling was more likely 
considered to fall outside the realm of behaviors that could be 
attributed to mental disorders.82 The scientific community 
significantly changed its approach toward recognizing excessive 
gambling as a potential mental disorder in 1980 when pathological 
gambling was listed in DSM-III as an “impulse control disorder.”83 
This inclusion spurred a sudden growth in the amount of scientific 
research on gambling disorder and introduced the issue to the general 
public.84  
Even after pathological gambling was first listed as a disorder in 
the DSM-III, academics continued to debate whether the disorder 
should be designated as an impulse-control disorder or as an 
 
 81. See ALAN F. COLLINS, The Pathological Gamblers and the Government of Gambling, in 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF RISK AND GAMBLING READER 355, 355 (James F. Cosgrove ed., 2006) 
(“One does not have to look back far for the picture to be very different: in the psychiatric and 
psychological writings of the 1970s . . . and before, the pathological gambler was a rare figure 
and one almost always denied the recognition afforded by an entry in the nosologies of mental 
illness.”). 
 82. Id. 
 83. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM-III]. The DSM plays a significant role in dictating 
the academically accepted list of mental disorders. See Douglas A. Hass, Could the American 
Psychiatric Association Cause You Headaches? The Dangerous Interaction Between the DSM-5 
and Employment Law, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 683 (2013) (“[The DSM] has long served as the 
primary reference for mental health disorders not only for medical practitioners, but also for 
state and federal courts and government agencies like the Social Security Administration and 
Veterans Administration.”). 
 84. See Henry R. Lesieur & Richard J. Rosenthal, Pathological Gambling: A Review of the 
Literature, 7 J. GAMBLING STUD. 5, 6 (1991) (“The 1980s have produced a burgeoning of 
interest in research into compulsive gambling.”). For a discussion of some of the earlier 
research, see John B. Murray, Review of Research on Pathological Gambling, 72 PSYCHOL. REP. 
791, 803 (1993) (noting that “the term pathological gambler took on definite meaning only 
recently through the DSM-III” and that “studies of pathological gambling, especially those that 
put compulsive gambling together with alcoholism and substance abuse, suggest that gambling 
may be related to other psychiatric and medical disorders”). The DSM’s inclusion is probably 
not the only factor contributing to the dramatic surge in gambling-disorder research: it should 
come as no surprise that the growth of gambling research has run alongside significant 
expansions in the gambling industry, as legalization has increased both the variety and 
availability of gambling activity. Howard J. Shaffer & David A. Korn, Gambling and Related 
Mental Disorders: A Public Health Analysis, 23 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 171, 171, 174–75 
(2002). 
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addiction.85 Both the DSM-III and its successor, the DSM-IV, did not 
label pathological gambling as an addictive mental disorder, but 
classified the condition in a general category of “impulse control 
disorders not elsewhere classified.”86 In addition to gambling disorder, 
this catchall category included kleptomania,87 intermittent explosive 
disorder,88 pyromania,89 and trichotillomania.90 Like the DSM-III, the 
DSM-IV grouped all of these listed impulse-control disorders by a 
common “failure to resist an impulse . . . to perform an act that is 
harmful to the person or to others.”91 The DSM-IV distinguished 
these impulses to act—which result from the “increasing sense of 
tension or arousal” preceding the performance of a compulsive act—
from the “pleasure, gratification, or relief” experienced by an 
individual after acting on that impulse.92 The DSM-IV classified 
pathological gambling by its essential diagnostic feature of “persistent 
and recurrent maladaptive gambling behavior . . . that disrupts 
personal, family, or vocational pursuits.”93 
2. Reclassification of Gambling as an Addictive Disorder Under 
the DSM-5. Critics of the classification of compulsive gambling under 
the DSM-III and DSM-IV claimed that “compulsive gambling” was a 
misnomer and that the categorization of pathological gambling as an 
impulse-control disorder—that is, as a compulsion—was a 
misconception.94 Although addictions often involve compulsive 
 
 85. See, e.g., Michael Walker, The Medicalisation of Gambling as an “Addiction”, in 
GAMBLING CULTURES: STUDIES IN HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 223, 223 (Jan McMillen 
ed., 1996) (arguing that the understanding of “heavy gambling [as] pathological is recent in 
origin . . . , that a pathology of gambling as an addiction has not been demonstrated, and that the 
similarities between drug addiction and heavy gambling are overstated”). 
 86. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 671 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV]; DSM-III, supra note 83. 
 87. Kleptomania manifests in an individual stealing things. DSM-IV, supra note 86, at 667. 
 88. Intermittent explosive disorder manifests in frequent emotional outbursts of anger or 
rage. Id. at 663. 
 89. Pyromania manifests in an individual setting fires. Id. at 669. 
 90. Trichotillomania manifests in an individual pulling his or her own hair out. Id. at 674. 
 91. Id. at 663. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 671.  
 94. Lesieur & Rosenthal, supra note 84, at 6–7; see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. 
ON THE SOC. & ECON. IMPACT OF PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING, PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING: A 
CRITICAL REVIEW 11–12, 20, 23–24 (1999), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/
NBK230630/pdf/TOC.pdf (“[F]or most researchers and many clinicians, the notion of 
compulsive gambling as a description of pathological gamblers is a technical misnomer.” 
(citation omitted)). 
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behaviors,95 they can be distinguished from purely compulsive 
disorders.96 
Under the DSM-5, compulsions are defined as “repetitive 
behaviors or mental acts that an individual feels driven to perform in 
response to an obsession or according to rules that must be applied 
rigidly.”97 Compulsive behaviors are not only involuntary, but are also 
“ego-dystonic,” meaning that the afflicted individual views her 
behavior as alien or foreign.98 For example, an individual with 
obsessive-compulsive disorder may be driven to frequently wash his 
hands with a precise number of strokes each time.99 Though 
performing this hand-washing ritual provides relief from his 
psychological discomfort, it does not provide pleasure, and can be 
ultimately construed as “unwilling.”100 This can be directly contrasted 
with the “ego-syntonic” and even pleasure-producing natures of 
addictive behaviors.101 
Diagnostically speaking, impulse-control disorders—the category 
that until recently included pathological gambling—can be even 
further differentiated from addiction.102 Impulse-control disorders not 
only feature compulsive behaviors, but do so in a specific context. 
Under the DSM-5, impulse-control disorders are “unique” due to 
their tendency to “manifest[] in behaviors that violate the rights of 
others . . . and/or bring the individual into significant conflict with 
 
 95. See Edmund Henden, Hans Olav Melberg & Ole Jørgen Røgeberg, Addiction: Choice 
or Compulsion?, 4 FRONTIERS IN PSYCHIATRY, Aug. 2013, at 9 (applying a dual-process 
analysis of compulsion in addiction); Nora D. Volkow & Joanna S. Fowler, Addiction, a Disease 
of Compulsion and Drive: Involvement of the Orbitofrontal Cortex, 10 CEREBRAL CORTEX 318, 
318 (2000) (proposing that in addition to disrupting traditional reward circuits, “the addictive 
state also involves disruption of circuits involved with compulsive behaviors and with drive”). 
 96. See Grant et al., supra note 78, at 234 (contrasting addiction with obsessive-compulsive 
disorder). 
 97. DSM-5, supra note 11, at 235. 
 98. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON THE SOC. & ECON. IMPACT OF 
PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING, supra note 94, at 24; Grant et al., supra note 78, at 234. 
 99. See DSM-5, supra note 11, at 237 (listing “[r]epetitive behaviors (e.g. hand washing . . .) 
or mental acts (e.g. . . . counting . . . )” as one of the diagnostic criteria of obsessive-compulsive 
disorder). 
 100. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON THE SOC. & ECON. IMPACT OF 
PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING, supra note 94, at 24. 
 101. Id.; see FERENTZY & TURNER, supra note 80, at 39 (“Drugs, alcohol, and gambling all 
provide a person with an opportunity for pleasure, so a pleasure principle is likely involved in 
the addiction.”). This is not to say that addicts experience pleasure at every stage of the 
addiction, but only that the original motivation can be pleasure-seeking. 
 102. See DSM-5, supra note 11, at 461. 
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societal norms or authority figures.”103 Furthermore, impulse-control 
disorders are believed to be tied to the personality dimension of 
disinhibition and most frequently emerge during childhood.104 
In contrast to impulse-control disorders, gambling disorder 
closely resembles addictive disorders like alcoholism and drug 
abuse.105 The DSM-5 reflects this characterization, removing 
pathological gambling from the group of impulse-control disorders.106 
In place of pathological gambling, the DSM-5 creates a newly named 
“gambling disorder,” which is located in a new category of 
“Substance-Related and Addictive Disorders.”107 This new category 
combines all of the conditions previously classified as “substance-
related disorders,” such as alcohol and drug dependency, with 
addiction-based disorders, such as gambling disorder.108 The 
American Psychiatric Association’s (APA’s) decision to craft this new 
category was a significant step in recognizing gambling disorder not as 
a compulsion or an impulse-control disorder, but as an addiction.109 
As the APA explained, this change “reflects the increasing and 
consistent evidence that . . . gambling . . . activate[s] the brain reward 
system with effects similar to those of drugs of abuse” and that the 
symptoms of gambling disorder and substance-use disorders are 
similar in nature.110 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 461–62. 
 105. Id. at 481. 
 106. See id. at 461–80 (describing the category of “[d]isruptive, impulse-control, and conduct 
disorders” without including gambling-related conditions). 
 107. Id. at 585. It should be noted that the DSM-5’s reclassification of gambling disorder was 
met with some resistance. See Constance Holden, Behavioral Addictions Debut in Proposed 
DSM-V, 327 SCIENCE 935 (2010) (“[P]roposed revisions for [DSM-5] include for the first time 
‘behavioral addictions’—a change some say is long overdue and others say is still premature.”). 
Critics of gambling addictions argue, among other things, that the view of gambling as an 
addiction relies on an incomplete account of the evidence, that the pathology of gambling 
addictions has not been demonstrated, and that similarities between drug addiction and heavy 
gambling are overstated. See, e.g., Varpu Rantala & Pekka Sulkunen, Is Pathological Gambling 
Just a Big Problem or Also an Addiction?, 20 ADDICTION RES. & THEORY 1, 1 (2012) (“The 
question is whether these new addictions are real psycho-social phenomena, or merely external 
social constructions to medicalise these problems.”). 
 108. DSM-5, supra note 11, at 481–82. 
 109. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, HIGHLIGHTS OF CHANGES FROM DSM-IV-TR TO DSM-5, at 
16 (2013), available at http://www.dsm5.org/Documents/changes%20from%20dsm-iv-
tr%20to%20dsm-5.pdf. 
 110. Id. 
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C. Gambling Disorder Under Scientific Addiction Models 
In order to understand how gambling disorder may operate as an 
addictive disorder, it is necessary to become familiar with the 
psychological field’s prevailing models of addiction. Research on 
substance-related addiction has revealed a “cluster of cognitive, 
behavioral, and physiological symptoms” whose interaction helps 
explain how an addiction persists despite its detrimental effect on the 
life of the addict.111 These physiological symptoms involve intricate 
neurological mechanisms that stimulate and reinforce addictive 
behavior. For example, the APA has noted an underlying change in 
the brain’s circuitry that accompanies the development of a 
substance-related addiction,112 and researchers using neuroimaging 
technology have found similarities in the neurocircuitry of individuals 
with behavioral addictions and those with substance-abuse 
disorders.113 Although scientists have backed away from using the 
classical neurobiological model—that is, that addiction is solely 
driven by neurotransmitted “rewards”—they believe that the 
“rewards” provided by chemical neurotransmitters like dopamine and 
serotonin nevertheless play an important role in dependence and 
withdrawal.114 Thus, although scientists still do not fully understand 
the neurological basis of gambling, new evidence suggests that the 
neurotransmitter activity of gambling addicts is similar to the kind 
observed in other addicts.115 At the end of the day, “as far as the brain 
is concerned, a reward’s a reward, regardless of whether it comes 
from a chemical or an experience.”116 
Behavioral symptoms of an underlying gambling addiction are 
manifestations of the roles that operant conditioning117 and classical 
 
 111. DSM-5, supra note 11, at 483. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Grant et al., supra note 78, at 236. 
 114. Judson A. Brewer, Marc N. Potenza & Jon E. Grant, The Neurobiology of Pathological 
Gambling, in RESEARCH AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES IN GAMBLING STUDIES 345, 346–54 
(Garry Smith, David C. Hodgins & Robert J. Williams eds., 2007). 
 115. See Grant et al., supra note 78, at 235 (“A growing body of literature implicates 
multiple neurotransmitter systems . . . [which] may contribute significantly to both sets of 
disorders.”); see also Jakob Linnet, Neurological Underpinnings of Reward Anticipation and 
Outcome Evaluation in Gambling Disorder, 8 FRONTIERS BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE, Mar. 2014, 
at 1 (“Gambling disorder is associated with dysfunctions in the dopamine system.”). 
 116. Constance Holden, “Behavioral” Addictions: Do They Exist?, 294 SCIENCE 980, 980 
(2001). 
 117. Operant conditioning, or instrumental learning, focuses on how behavior can be 
changed through the use of positive reinforcement and negative reinforcement delivered after a 
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conditioning118 play in forming addictions.119 Viewing gambling 
disorder through the lens of operant conditioning, gamblers are 
positively reinforced when they realize financial gains from their 
gambling,120 and negatively reinforced when they continue to gamble 
as a coping mechanism to ignore negative feelings of stress, anxiety, 
guilt, and depression.121 From a classical perspective, environmental 
stimuli like the lights and sounds of a slot machine may create mental 
associations with gambling that reinforce participation.122 Therefore, 
as a result of classical conditioning, the slot-machine player, upon 
entering the casino and approaching the chosen slot machine, 
anticipates and begins to crave the rush he or she feels at each spin.123 
And while playing, as a result of operant conditioning, the slot-
machine player’s wins and losses provide enough of a reward to 
stimulate the player to continue playing in anticipation of a future 
reward.124 The gambling addict’s responses to both the visual stimuli 
 
specific behavioral response. See J.E.R. Staddon & D.T. Cerutti, Operant Conditioning, 54 ANN. 
REV. PSYCHOL. 115, 116 (2003) (discussing the use of “reinforcement schedules” in operant 
conditioning). 
 118. Classical conditioning, also called Pavlovian conditioning, relies on the use of “neutral 
or arbitrary cues” over time to elicit certain behaviors, like the well-known story of the dog 
salivating when it hears a bell. Michael Domjan, Pavlovian Conditioning: A Functional 
Perspective, 56 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 179, 180 (2005). 
 119. See Amy L. Milton & Barry J. Everitt, The Persistence of Maladaptive Memory: 
Addiction, Drug Memories and Anti-Relapse Treatments, 36 NEUROSCIENCE & 
BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 1119, 1120–25 (2012) (discussing the Pavlovian and instrumental 
associations underlying drug addiction). 
 120. It may seem counterintuitive, but the sporadic nature of gambling wins may provide 
stronger reinforcement than steady wins over time. See Christopher D. Fiorillo, Philippe N. 
Tobler & Wolfram Schultz, Discrete Coding of Reward Probability and Uncertainty by 
Dopamine Neurons, 299 SCIENCE 1898, 1901 (2003) (finding that “sustained, uncertainty-
induced increase in dopamine could act to reinforce risk-taking behavior”); Peter Shizgal & 
Andreas Arvanitogiannis, Gambling on Dopamine, 299 SCIENCE 1856, 1858 (2003) (examining 
the Fiorillo study, supra, and its potential implications for gambling-behavior theorists). 
 121. Contrary to popular misconception, “negative reinforcement” in the field of operant 
conditioning is not synonymous with “punishment.” See Jack Michael, Positive and Negative 
Reinforcement, 3 BEHAVIORISM 33, 37–38 (1975) (discussing misinterpretations of Skinner’s 
terminology). Instead, it refers to the removal of an aversive stimulus. Id. Therefore, negative 
reinforcement encourages the performed behavior by creating a positive result through the 
subtraction of a negative condition. Id. 
 122. See generally NATASHA DOW SCHÜLL, ADDICTION BY DESIGN: MACHINE GAMBLING 
IN LAS VEGAS (2012) (providing an in-depth look at how casinos design environmental stimuli 
to maximize time spent on a slot machine or other gambling device). 
 123. Id. at 49–50 (recounting one gambler’s experience trying to avoid his regular slot 
machine in the casino). 
 124. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
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and the game’s reinforcement mechanisms are behavioral symptoms 
of addiction. 
Research indicates that gambling disorder and substance-abuse 
disorders may share certain cognitive features.125 The primary—and 
unique—cognitive mechanism that drives gambling disorder, 
however, is the role that irrational belief plays in maintaining the 
addiction.126 Gamblers’ predominant irrational belief is the “illusion of 
control” present when the gambler believes that his skill plays a role 
in determining the outcome of a game of chance.127 Therefore, even 
when the slot-machine player loses, he may analyze the patterns of 
slot-machine results to predict future wins or become reassured of a 
future win by the thought that he was “so close” to the jackpot.128 
Despite the objective reality that the player lacks control over the slot 
machine’s draws, the player’s irrational belief attributes a sort of logic 
and strategy to the game, even when neither exists.129 Therefore, even 
after losing, he will continue to play, believing that winning will come 
soon based on his analysis of the patterns and perceived “near 
miss.”130 
The interaction of these physiological, behavioral, and cognitive 
mechanisms can be demonstrated through different models of 
addiction. The simplest model of addiction is the traditional model, 
which has three elements: a form of dependence, a progression or 
 
 125. Grant et al., supra note 78, at 235 (“Both pathological gamblers and individuals with 
substance use disorders typically discount rewards rapidly and perform disadvantageously on 
decision-making tasks such as the Iowa Gambling Task, a paradigm that assesses risk-reward 
decision making.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 126. Cristina Orgaz, Ana Estevez & Helena Matute, Pathological Gamblers Are More 
Vulnerable to the Illusion of Control in a Standard Associative Learning Task, 4 FRONTIERS 
PSYCHOL. 1, 1–2 (2013), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3683617/pdf/
fpsyg-04-00306.pdf. 
 127. Id.; see Luke Clark, Bettina Studer, Joel Bruss, Daniel Tranel & Antoine Bechara, 
Damage to Insula Abolishes Cognitive Distortions During Simulated Gambling, 111 PROC. 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6098, 6100–02 (2014) (describing how the “gambler’s fallacy” functions, and 
suggesting that the gambler’s fallacy is attributable to activity in the brain’s insular cortex). 
 128. R.L. Reid, The Psychology of the Near Miss, 2 J. GAMBLING STUD. 32, 32 (1986), 
available at http://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~aldous/157/Papers/near_miss.pdf.  
 129. See Chrisi Lambos & Paul Delfabbro, Numerical Reasoning Ability and Irrational 
Beliefs in Problem Gambling, 7 INT’L GAMBLING STUD. 157, 168 (finding through empirical 
analysis that an increase in levels of irrational belief corresponds to an increase in the frequency 
of gambling among participants more closely than to an increase in numerical reasoning 
abilities). 
 130. See Reid, supra note 128, at 32 (“In [gambling], the occurrence of a near miss may be 
taken as an encouraging sign, confirming the player’s strategy and raising hopes for future 
success.”). 
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increase in activity over time, and withdrawal symptoms during 
periods without the substance or behavior.131 A common illustration 
of the traditional model of addiction is the slot-machine player.132 An 
individual player may form a dependence on the activity of machine 
gambling.133 Once this dependence has formed, the player’s level of 
activity increases over time: the player may start to gamble more 
frequently, or the player may raise the stakes in play.134 Withdrawal 
symptoms are evidenced when the player’s attempts to cut back on 
gambling cause him or her to experience negative feelings like anxiety 
or irritability.135  
The slightly more nuanced “components” model of addiction has 
six elements: salience, mood modification, tolerance, withdrawal, 
conflict, and relapse.136 There is significant overlap among the 
elements of the components model and the traditional model. The 
first element of the components model, salience, focuses on how 
important the behavior becomes to the individual, based on the 
notion that addictive behaviors often overshadow the importance of 
all other activities.137 The hypothetical slot-machine player may begin 
to value his time gambling above all other areas of his life, including 
family, friends, employment, and personal well-being. The second 
element of the components model, mood modification, specifies the 
change in feelings an individual experiences when engaging in an 
 
 131. See COLLINS, supra note 81, at 358–59 (“[There are] three key requirements for an 
addiction: some form of dependence, progression, and withdrawal symptoms in the absence of 
the drug or behaviour.”).  
 132. The slot-machine player is an appropriate example to demonstrate addiction models 
because the models’ predictions most likely mirror reality for a number of gambling addicts 
dependent on slot machines. See generally SCHÜLL, supra note 122 (discussing gambling 
addiction among gambling-machine players). 
 133. See id. at 190 (relating the story of gambling-machine addict Patsy: “[w]hen I wasn’t 
playing . . . my whole being was directed to getting back into that zone”). 
 134. See id. at 107 (quoting a gambling-machine player: “I keep needing more intensity, and 
the machines keep matching me”). 
 135. See id. at 210 (quoting machine gambler Randall relating how he would “get disgusted 
with [himself] playing that little machine . . . but the fact is, I always went and played anyway.”); 
id. at 215 (quoting another machine gambler, Isabella, who tried to stop gambling, but would 
“get so bothered by the machines when [getting] baby formula at the store” that she would try 
to ignore them, “but it [didn’t] always work”). 
 136. See generally Mark Griffiths, A ‘Components’ Model of Addiction Within a 
Biopsychosocial Framework, 10 J. SUBSTANCE USE 191 (2005) (offering what the author 
believes are components of addiction: “salience, mood modification, tolerance, withdrawal, 
conflict, and relapse”). 
 137. Id. at 193. 
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addictive behavior—colloquially referred to as a “rush” or a “high.”138 
The mood-modification element might indicate why the slot-machine 
player may have turned to gambling in the first place: playing the 
slots may provide the player with an escape from stress, sadness, and 
other negative feelings.139  
The tolerance element explains why a player feels he must 
increase or intensify his gameplay; as the player continues the activity 
over time, an increasing amount of the activity is needed to achieve 
the same mood-modification effect.140 The component model’s 
withdrawal element closely adheres to the traditional model’s concept 
of withdrawal—where the gambler experiences negative symptoms 
during attempts to curb his behavior.141 Withdrawal symptoms range 
from the psychological—for example, moodiness and irritability—to 
the physiological—such as nausea, headaches, and insomnia.142 
Conflict, an element added by the components model, refers to the 
“interpersonal conflict” that can occur as the player’s relationships 
become strained due to his diverted attention or increased stress, or 
as his finances dwindle due to the costs of significant game play.143 The 
conflict element can also refer to “intrapsychic conflict” as the slot-
machine player struggles internally about his behavior.144 Finally, the 
negative feelings caused by attempts to quit or reduce the level of 
gambling might eventually lead to the final element of relapse—a 
return to the slot machines.145 
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE ADA’S EXCLUSION OF GAMBLING 
ADDICTION AS A DISABILITY 
This Note proposes that Congress amend the ADA provision 
excluding compulsive gambling as a disability to allow the recognition 
of gambling disorder. First, inclusion of the newly classified gambling 
disorder is in line with the spirit of the ADA. Second, the exclusion of 
 
 138. Id.  
 139. See Richard T.A. Wood & Mark D. Griffiths, A Qualitative Investigation of Problem 
Gambling as an Escape-Based Coping Strategy, 80 PSYCHOL. & PSYCHOTHERAPY 107, 114 (“[A 
gambling] buzz could be perceived as relaxing by filling time, avoiding boredom and/or shifting 
focus away from life’s problems . . . .”). 
 140. Griffiths, supra note 136, at 194. 
 141. Id. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 142. Griffiths, supra note 136, at 194. 
 143. Id. at 195. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
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gambling disorder as a disability stymies the expected role that 
diagnostic and scientific texts like the DSM play in the legal process. 
Third, the exclusion as currently interpreted creates loopholes in 
cases of comorbidity that might make it harder for gambling addicts 
with other conditions protected under the ADA to succeed in 
employment-discrimination claims. 
A. The Spirit of the ADA 
Upon its enactment, the ADA was touted as a “comprehensive 
bill” that would “extend civil rights protections to 43 million disabled 
persons in the United States.”146 Lawmakers went so far as to call the 
bill “an emancipation proclamation for persons with disabilities.”147 
The National Council on Disability, which had played a crucial role in 
the passage of the ADA, remarked that “[f]uture generations [would] 
look back on the passage of the ADA as a watershed public policy.”148 
It is indisputable that the ADA has achieved much in the way of 
integration and antidiscrimination for individuals with disabilities in 
the United States.149 
Despite its initial fanfare, however, the ADA has failed to 
completely live up to the expectations of its creators. Current 
critiques of the ADA can be divided into three categories: criticism 
that views the statute as “poorly written and structurally flawed,” 
criticism “that the ADA has been betrayed by judicial backlash,” and 
criticism “that disability-based workplace accommodations are 
inefficient and create disincentives to employing disabled persons.”150 
The problems presented by the ADA are likely caused by some 
combination of all three criticisms.151 Whatever the case may be, the 
 
 146. 135 CONG. REC. S17,559 (1989). 
 147. 136 CONG. REC. S17,369 (1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin). 
 148. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, Foreword, July 26, 1997 to EQUALITY OF 
OPPORTUNITY: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (1997), available at 
http://www.ncd.gov/publications/1997/equality_of_Opportunity_The_Making_of_the_American
s_with_Disabilities_Act. 
 149. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Expanding Opportunity in the Community for People with 
Disabilities, ADA.GOV, http://www.ada.gov/disability-rights-accomplishments.htm (last visited 
Jan. 23, 2015) (listing accomplishments in public accommodation, civic participation, and ADA 
enforcement by DOJ’s Civil Rights Division from 2009−2012). 
 150. Michael Ashley Stein, Michael E. Waterstone & David B. Wilkins, Cause Lawyering 
for People with Disabilities, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1658, 1659 (2010). 
 151. For a more in-depth discussion of the issue of judicial backlash to broad readings of the 
ADA, see infra Part IV.B. 
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scope of the ADA’s coverage is dramatically narrower than 
lawmakers seem to have envisioned.152 
Although Congress received praise for passing what seemed like 
an evenhanded law, in the reality of the courtroom, plaintiffs bringing 
ADA claims face an uphill battle. Defendants have largely prevailed 
against ADA claims in the courts, winning dismissals, summary 
judgments, verdicts, and appeals at high rates.153 Challengers bringing 
winning claims under the ADA remain a distinct minority. A 2006 
study revealed a plaintiff success rate of less than 3 percent in all Title 
I claims.154 
These numbers are surely disappointing for lawmakers and the 
estimated forty-three million Americans with disabilities they sought 
to protect.155 For these forty-three million individuals, the ADA was 
intended to “break down these barriers [to communicating, 
commuting, or entering the workplace] once and for all.”156 Based on 
recent estimates, the number of Americans with a disability has 
grown to 56.7 million.157 To be sure, not all individuals with disabilities 
have cause to seek remedy in the courts, so low plaintiff success rates 
alone do not show that the ADA has failed. But, as of 2007, the 
ADA’s protections are estimated to cover fewer than 13.5 million 
 
 152. See S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Something Borrowed, Something Blue: Why Disability 
Law Claims Are Different, 33 CONN. L. REV. 603, 605 (2001) (“These laudable goals [of the 
ADA] have yet to be realized. Ten years after the enactment of the ADA, studies have shown 
that people with disabilities continue to see virtually the same disadvantages in the labor market 
that they experienced prior to the enactment of the ADA.”). 
 153. Eliza Kaiser, The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Unfulfilled Promise for 
Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 735, 739 (2004). “[B]etween 
1992 and 1998, plaintiffs won in only 6% of the cases at the trial court level.” Id.; see Ruth 
Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 99, 100 (1999) (“[D]efendants prevail in more than ninety-three percent of reported ADA 
employment discrimination cases . . . .”); Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 277 (2001) (finding that as an empirical 
matter “defendants are much more likely than plaintiffs to prevail in appellate litigation”). 
 154. See Amy L. Albright, 2006 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I—Survey 
Update, 31 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 328, 328 (2007) (“Of the 218 [Title I] 
decisions [in 2006] that resolved the claim (and have not yet changed on appeal), 97.2 percent 
resulted in employer wins and 2.8 percent in employee wins.”). 
 155. 135 CONG. REC. S17,559 (1989). 
 156. Id. 
 157. MATTHEW W. BRAULT, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: 2010, at 4 (2012), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p70-131.pdf. This estimate, excluding institutionalized 
individuals, equals 18.7 percent of the civilian population. Id. 
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Americans.158 Therefore, millions of disabled individuals, whom 
Congress described as “the real champions of [the ADA]” and 
instructed “to never allow their vigil to wane,”159 have not realized the 
benefits that Congress promised in passing the ADA. 
This shortcoming is no reason to throw out the entire ADA, 
which has accomplished or made great strides toward many of 
Congress’s original goals.160 Rather, the underperformance should 
incite lawmakers to reexamine the ADA’s current coverage. 
Amending the ADA to remove the exclusion of compulsive gambling 
would be a significant improvement for individuals with gambling 
disorder because such a recognition of their condition would crack 
open, however slightly, the gate to the ADA, which is currently shut 
by the Act’s definition of disability. 
B. The Role of the DSM-5 
The DSM is not just a scientific text;161 it has also long been a 
“primary authority for the legal community.”162 Though the DSM’s 
authority is neither absolute nor incontrovertible,163 the publication 
has been “elevated . . . to the level of de facto legal treatise” among 
employment lawyers.164 Even though the DSM-5 adds a cautionary 
statement that “[i]n most situations, the clinical diagnosis of a DSM-5 
mental disorder . . . does not imply that an individual with such a 
condition meets legal criteria for the presence of a mental disorder or 
a specified legal standard,”165 diagnoses based on the DSM frequently 
 
 158. Ruth Colker, The Mythic 43 Million Americans with Disabilities, 49 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1, 7 (2007). And in Colker’s estimation, “those [13.5 million] individuals [are] typically . . . 
so disabled that they are not qualified to work even with reasonable accommodations.” Id. 
 159. 136 CONG. REC. 9684-03 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement of Sen. John McCain). 
 160. See generally U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, ENFORCING THE ADA: LOOKING BACK ON A 
DECADE OF PROGRESS (2000), available at http://www.ada.gov/pubs/10thrpt.pdf (highlighting 
the ADA’s achievements). 
 161. The DSM plays an important role in the medical and psychiatric communities, and its 
“criteria for diagnosis provide a common language among clinicians,” ensuring accuracy and 
consistency across practitioners. REILLY & SMITH, supra note 33, at 1.  
 162. Hass, supra note 83, at 683. 
 163. Id. at 689 (“[T]he DSM-IV is simply a consensus-built medical text with the attendant 
limits. It is not a psychiatric ‘bible.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
 164. Id. at 685. 
 165. DSM-5, supra note 11, at 25; see Osika v. Bd. of Educ., No. 98 C 5953, 1999 WL 
1044838, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 1999) (“The issue is not whether depression and other mental 
and emotional disorders are ‘impairments’ within the purview of the ADA. They certainly are. 
. . . Suffering from a medical condition that is listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
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play a role in the legal determination of the existence of a mental 
disorder,166 such as the establishment of disability in ADA cases.167 In 
fact, the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) has pointed to the DSM as a source that can be used in 
identifying the types of mental disorders cognizable under the 
ADA.168 Notwithstanding the uncertainty surrounding the possible 
effects of a new edition, as courts begin to hear testimony from 
experts relying on the DSM-5, the DSM-5’s extensive revisions have 
the potential to drive parallel changes in several areas of the law, 
including employment discrimination.169 
The changes from previous editions in the DSM-5 would support 
the ADA’s recognition of gambling addiction as a disability. The 
original categorization of compulsive gambling in the ADA’s list of 
excluded conditions mirrors the DSM-IV’s list of “impulse control 
disorders not elsewhere classified.”170 In both the ADA and the DSM-
IV, gambling sits alongside its familiar bedfellows, pyromania and 
kleptomania.171 In the DSM-5, however, gambling disorder is 
distanced from those conditions172 through the use of different 
diagnostic criteria and is associated instead with substance-related 
disorders that currently fall squarely under the protection of the 
 
(DSM), however, is not dispositive to the legal inquiry of whether a plaintiff is protected by the 
ADA.”). 
 166. RALPH SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATRY IN LAW/LAW IN PSYCHIATRY 161 (2d ed. 2009).  
 167. Jules L. Smith, Understanding How To Apply the DSM-IV to a Case Under the ADA, 
17 LAB. LAW. 449, 455 (2002); see also Schwartz v. Comex, No. 96 CIV. 3386 LAP, 1997 WL 
187353, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1997) (noting that the DSM “offers some guidance” on what 
the plaintiff’s claimed disability of paranoid-thought disorder was). Note that the DSM’s 
diagnostic criteria do not always support the ADA’s definition of disability. See Brown v. N. 
Trust Bank, No. 95 C 7559, 1997 WL 543098, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 1997) (holding that because 
the plaintiff’s DSM diagnosis was a single episode of depression, her impairment was temporary, 
and thus not a disability under the ADA). 
 168. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 62, at 2–3 (recognizing the DSM “as 
an important reference by courts . . . widely used by American mental health professionals”). 
 169. For an example of how changes in previous editions of the DSM have changed courts’ 
construction of existing law, see Alan Stone, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and the Law: 
Critical Review of the New Frontier, 21 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 23, 23 (1993) (“No 
diagnosis in the history of American psychiatry has had a more dramatic and pervasive impact 
on law and social justice than PTSD.”). 
 170. DSM-IV, supra note 86, at 671. 
 171. Compare id. (recognizing pathological gambling, kleptomania, and pyromania as 
impulse control disorders), with 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(2) (2012) (excluding “compulsive 
gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania” from ADA coverage). 
 172. Compare DSM-5, supra note 11, at 476, 478 (listing diagnostic criteria for pyromania 
and kleptomania, respectively), with id. at 585 (listing diagnostic criteria for gambling disorder).  
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ADA.173 Therefore, it seems arbitrary to exclude one DSM-classified 
addiction from ADA coverage but allow ADA protection for the 
others. 
Changes to the DSM classification of gambling disorder, 
however, are not enough to bring gambling disorder under the 
ADA’s protections. Compulsive gambling is explicitly excluded from 
coverage in the ADA, and without a statutory amendment, the newly 
branded gambling disorder is almost certainly excluded as well. The 
DSM-5’s classification of gambling disorder as an addiction cannot 
simply be judicially incorporated into the ADA because judges, no 
matter how creative, are limited in their powers of statutory 
interpretation. The court’s inability to recognize gambling disorder as 
a disability cuts against the drafters’ concern that the ADA’s 
definition of disability must be flexible enough to encompass “new 
disorders [that] may develop in the future.”174 Given the weight of the 
DSM’s authority in proving mental disorders in conjunction with the 
DSM’s newly recognized gambling disorder, the ADA should be 
amended to remove its outdated exclusion of “compulsive gambling.” 
C. Comorbidity Loopholes 
The current exclusion creates further potential problems in 
ADA cases involving comorbid conditions that in some circumstances 
create loopholes for employers to discriminate against individuals 
with both ADA-recognized disabilities and ADA-excluded comorbid 
conditions. Comorbidity occurs in individuals who have two or more 
coexisting medical conditions.175 Comorbid conditions in an individual 
might be causally linked or otherwise associated, or they might be 
 
 173. See Dovenmuehler v. St. Cloud Hosp., 509 F.3d 435, 439 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Drug 
addiction that substantially limits one or more major life activities is a recognized disability 
under the ADA.”); Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 2002) (same); Bailey v. Ga.-
Pac. Corp., 306 F.3d 1162, 1167 (1st Cir. 2002) (“There is no question that alcoholism is an 
impairment for the purposes of the first prong of analysis under the ADA.”). 
 174. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 20 (1989). 
 175. See Carrie N. Klabunde, Joan L. Warren & Julie M. Legler, Assessing Comorbidity 
Using Claims Data, 40 MED. CARE IV-26, IV-26 (2002) (“Comorbidities are additional diseases 
beyond the condition under study.”); Ismene L. Petrakis, Gerardo Gonzalez, Robert Rosenheck 
& John H. Krystal, Comorbidity of Alcoholism and Psychiatric Disorders, 2 ALCOHOL RES. & 
HEALTH 81, 81 (2002), available at http://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/arh26-2/81-89.pdf 
(defining comorbidity as a “dual diagnosis”). 
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entirely unrelated; all that is required for conditions to be considered 
comorbid is that an individual have both at the same time.176 
Comorbidity rates are especially high in cases involving gambling 
disorder, meaning that individuals with a gambling disorder are likely 
to also have other physical or mental conditions.177 Separate studies 
have found comorbidity overlap between gambling disorder and sleep 
disorders,178 substance abuse and alcoholism,179 and depression,180 as 
was the case for John Trammell.181 Though comorbidity rates do not 
necessarily indicate any causal links between gambling disorder and 
the other conditions, they do demonstrate an appreciable chance that 
an individual diagnosed with gambling disorder might have another 
medical condition.182 And, unlike gambling disorder, the potential 
 
 176. See M. Grabicki, H. Parysek, H. Batura-Gabryel & I. Brodnicka, Comorbidities as an 
Element of Multidimensional Prognostic Assessment of Patients with Chronic Obstructive 
Pulmonary Disease, 59 J. PHYSIOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 297, 298 (2008) (dividing discussed 
comorbidities into categories including “comorbid diseases with a common pathophysiology,” 
“conditions that arise as a complication” of the primary condition, and “co-incidental 
comorbidities with unrelated pathogenesis”). 
 177. See Angela Ibáñez, Carlos Blanco, Elizabeth Donahue, Henry R. Lesieur, Igancio 
Pérez de Castro, José Fernández-Piqueras & Jerónimo Sáiz-Ruiz, Psychiatric Comorbidity in 
Pathological Gamblers Seeking Treatment, 158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1733, 1734 (2001) (finding a 
“high rate and wide range of comorbid psychiatric disorders” among diagnosed pathological 
gamblers seeking treatment). 
 178. Iman Parhami, Aaron Siani, Richard J. Rosenthal & Timothy W. Fong, Pathological 
Gambling, Problem Gambling and Sleep Complaints: An Analysis of the National Comorbidity 
Survey, 29 J. GAMBLING STUD. 241, 248–50 (2013). 
 179. See Renee M. Cunningham-Williams, Linda B. Cotter, Wilson M. Compton III & 
Edward L. Spitznagel, Taking Chances: Problem Gamblers and Mental Health Disorders—
Results from the St. Louis Epidemiologic Catchment Area Study, 88 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1093, 
1093 (1998) (finding problem gamblers “at an increased risk for several psychiatric diagnoses, 
especially . . . alcoholism[] and tobacco dependence”); Gladys W. Hall, Nicholas J. Carriero, 
Ruby Y. Takushi, Ivan D. Montoya, Kenzie L. Preston & David A. Gorelick, Pathological 
Gambling Among Cocaine-Dependent Outpatients, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1127, 1127 (2000) 
(finding a higher prevalence of pathological gamblers among cocaine-dependent outpatients as 
compared with the general population); Tony Toneatto & Judy Brennan, Pathological 
Gambling in Treatment-Seeking Substance Abusers, 27 ADDICTIVE BEHAV. 465, 465 (2002) 
(finding high rates of gambling problems among treatment-seeking substance abusers); see also 
NANCY M. PETRY, PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING: ETIOLOGY, COMORBIDITY, AND TREATMENT 
21, 86 (2005) (summarizing a number of studies, including those listed above). 
 180. See Sidney H. Kennedy et al., Frequency and Correlates of Gambling Problems in 
Outpatients with Major Depressive Disorder and Bipolar Disorder, 55 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 568, 
568 (2010) (finding that people with depression have higher rates of gambling). 
 181. See Trammell v. Raytheon Missile Sys., 721 F. Supp. 2d 876, 882–83 (D. Ariz. 2010). 
 182. Comorbidity and Gambling Disorders Fact Sheet, NAT’L CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE 
GAMING, http://www.ncrg.org/sites/default/files/oec/pdfs/ncrg_fact_sheet_comorbidity.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2015) (citing survey data finding that “96.3 percent of the lifetime pathological 
gamblers also met lifetime criteria for one or more other psychiatric disorders”). 
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comorbid conditions have been found by courts in some cases to 
qualify as disabilities under the ADA.183 
Serious legal complications can arise when an individual bringing 
a case for disability discrimination under the ADA suffers from a mix 
of potentially cognizable conditions, like depression, and certainly 
excluded conditions, like gambling disorder. John Trammell’s case 
serves as a stark illustration of these complexities. Although 
Trammell’s depression could meet the requirements of a disability, 
his claim on that basis was ultimately rejected.184 A prima facie case 
under Title I requires employer knowledge of the condition.185 
Because his employer, Raytheon, had no knowledge of his 
depression, Trammell’s depression claim hit a fatal stumbling block.186 
On the other hand, Raytheon undoubtedly had knowledge of 
Trammell’s gambling problems because Trammell had discussed 
them with the human-resources department. But Trammell was 
barred from bringing such a claim under the ADA.187 Instead, 
Trammell was forced to take a roundabout approach, arguing that his 
gambling addiction was a manifestation of his depression—an 
allowable underlying disability.188 This argument was summarily 
rejected.189 If Trammell’s gambling disorder could have been a 
cognizable disability under the ADA, the result might have been 
different.190 
Comorbidity rates among gambling addicts provide potential 
loopholes, making it easier for employers to discriminate against 
individuals with disabilities. Taking the illustration a step beyond the 
facts of the Trammell case, what if the employer had knowledge that 
an employee was suffering from both depression and gambling 
disorder? Because gambling-disorder claims are excluded, the 
employer might have been able to fire the doubly afflicted employee 
for the explicitly stated reason that the employee was a gambling 
 
 183. See, e.g., Duggins v. Appoquinimink Sch. Dist., 921 F. Supp. 2d 283, 290 (D. Del. 2013) 
(recognizing that the plaintiff’s severe depression qualified as a disability under the ADA). 
 184. Trammell, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 882–83. 
 185. See AMS. WITH DISABILITIES: PRACTICE & COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 7:391 (2014) 
(“Consistent with the requirement to show or suggest that the adverse employment action was 
taken for prohibited reasons, an employee making a prima facie case must show that the 
employer knew, or should have known, of the disability.”). 
 186. Trammell, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 877. 
 187. Id. at 882–83. 
 188. Complaint, supra note 24, at 2.  
 189. Trammell, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 877. 
 190. For a further discussion, see infra Part V. 
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addict. Even if the employee’s protected disability played a role in the 
termination decision, the employer could potentially use the excluded 
gambling disorder as a defensive bar to defeat the employee’s claim. 
The size and significance of this identified loophole depends 
heavily on whether mixed-motive analysis applies to ADA Title I 
claims. Mixed-motive analysis excuses defendants from liability for 
employment decisions in which discrimination against a protected 
status played a motivating part only if the defendant can prove that it 
would have made the same decision in the absence of the plaintiff’s 
protected status.191 This would effectively allow the aforementioned 
doubly afflicted employees to argue that their employers terminated 
them for their (unprotected) gambling addiction and their other 
protected disability. But currently, the question of whether mixed-
motive analysis applies in the ADA context is unresolved. Mixed-
motive claims are allowed in Title VII discrimination cases.192 Claims 
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, however, are not 
subject to mixed-motive analysis.193 Based on Gross, some courts have 
determined that mixed-motive analysis does not apply to ADA 
claims.194 Nevertheless, mixed-motive analysis is not an easy hurdle to 
clear. Therefore, whatever the status of mixed-motive analysis, the 
current ADA exclusion of gambling disorder either makes it 
extremely difficult or virtually impossible for gambling addicts to 
bring any otherwise-winning claim under the ADA. 
IV.  POTENTIAL DIFFICULTIES IN RECOGNIZING GAMBLING 
ADDICTION AS A DISABILITY 
Even if the disability status of gambling addicts under the ADA 
is reexamined, several factors pose challenges to the likelihood of 
reform. This Part first discusses how social moralism and the 
marginalization of addiction may prevent widespread popular 
acceptance—and perhaps more relevantly, lawmakers’ acceptance—
of gambling addiction as a “real” mental disorder. Next, it examines 
how courts have demonstrated a willingness to impose a narrow view 
of the definition of disability under the ADA. Finally, this Part 
considers how the proposed amendment can address employer 
 
 191. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 172 (2009). 
 194. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 318 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc); 
Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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concerns about potential risks and burdens imposed by protecting 
gambling addicts in the workplace. 
A. Social Moralism and the Marginalization of Addiction 
The concepts of disease and disability are normative, meaning 
that both can be defined as deviations from the social mean.195 But in 
the determination of what deviations count as “disabilities” under the 
ADA, public opinion and social values play a large role in 
categorization.196 Therefore, the ADA (and this Note’s proposed 
amendment) serves not only as a reflection of shifting social norms, 
but also as an embodiment of what society deems worthy of 
protecting.197 As Senator Harkin stated: 
There is a wellspring of fears and unfounded prejudices about 
people with disabilities, unfounded fears, whether people have 
mental disorders, whether they are manic depressives or 
schizophrenia or paranoia, or unfounded fears and prejudices based 
upon physical disabilities. The point of the bill is to start breaking 
down those barriers of fear and prejudice and unfounded fears, to 
get past that point so that people begin to look at people based on 
their abilities, not first looking at their disability.198 
Though the ADA was intended to fight myths and stereotypes 
associated with disability,199 its strategy for accomplishing this goal 
was selective. Instead of putting forth a welcome mat to all people 
with disabilities, the ADA underlined the bias society has toward 
those with mental disorders listed as sin exceptions,200 “carv[ing] out a 
new class of untouchables” defined by their socially repugnant 
behavior, like excessive gambling.201 
 
 195. Adrienne L. Hiegel, Sexual Exclusions: The Americans with Disabilities Act as a Moral 
Code, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1451, 1451 (1994). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 1452.  
 198. 135 CONG. REC. 19,866 (1989). 
 199. See supra notes 40–47 and accompanying text. 
 200. See 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (2012) (listing compulsive gambling and other “conditions” like 
homosexuality, bisexuality, transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, 
gender-identity disorders, other sexual-behavior disorders, kleptomania, pyromania, and 
psychoactive-substance-abuse disorders resulting from the illegal use of drugs). 
 201. Hiegel, supra note 195, at 1453. 
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Today, gambling addicts continue to face multiple layers of social 
stigma: stigma against disabilities,202 stigma against mental illnesses,203 
and stigma against gambling itself. Gambling has been called a 
“classic vice[]”—an activity traditionally viewed as morally 
condemnable that has undergone some level of legalization in our 
society.204 Gambling is often seen as a personal moral failing whose 
blame lies solely on the individual: “Within western cultures, useful 
employment, family life and the acquisition of material wealth are 
central goals of the sociali[z]ation process. The heavy gambler is seen 
as a failure by these standards.”205 
Before the development of modern psychiatry, gambling-related 
problems were often classified as a form of “moral insanity.”206 
Despite the removal of “moral insanity” from the psychiatric 
lexicon,207 morality-based objections to excessive gambling persist.208 
Not only has this stigma slowed widespread social acceptance of 
gambling addiction as a legitimate mental disorder, but it has also 
played a role in slowing scientific research into the topic.209 Thus, 
although the scientific community changed its conception of gambling 
from “gambling as sin” to “gambling as sick,” alongside its acceptance 
of the psychoanalytic perspective on human nature,210 societal 
acceptance still lags behind. The persistent lack of public acceptance 
 
 202. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability”, 86 VA. L. REV. 
397, 401 (2000) (noting that individuals with disabilities tend to experience social disadvantages 
and deprivation of opportunities). 
 203. See also Elizabeth F. Emens, Disabling Attitudes: U.S. Disability Law and the ADA 
Amendments Act, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 205, 208 (2012) (“When the conversation turns to people 
with cognitive or psychosocial (psychiatric) disabilities, however, then the whole person is 
tainted, discredited . . . .”). 
 204. John Dombrink, Gambling and the Legalisation of Vice: Social Movements, Public 
Health, and Public Policy in the United States, in GAMBLING CULTURES, supra note 85, at 43. 
The other “classic vices” listed include “abortion, homosexuality, drug use, pornography, and 
prostitution.” Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. COLLINS, supra note 81, at 366–71. 
 207. Lucy Ozarin, Moral Insanity: A Brief History, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS (May 18, 2001), 
http://psychnews.psychiatryonline.org/newsArticle.aspx?articleid=103040. 
 208. One author has even argued that the diagnostic criteria of pathological gambling in the 
DSM-IV themselves represented a medicalization of researchers’ previous moral objections to 
gambling behavior. Bo J. Bernhard, The Voices of Vices: Sociological Perspectives on the 
Pathological Gambling Entry in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 51 
AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 8, 9 (2007). 
 209. Id. at 11 (“[C]onservative moral forces have exerted subtle but powerful influences 
over academic inquiry.”). 
 210. Walker, supra note 85, at 223–24. 
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has kept gambling disorder in the shadows, and can affect lawmakers 
to the extent that they share these same views or that the lack of 
public acceptance obscures the issue as one requiring legal protection. 
Amidst the fight against the forces of social moralism, the 
growing marginalization of the very idea of addiction presents 
another barrier to ADA recognition of gambling addiction. In his 
examination of addiction, Jim Orford recognized “the danger of 
triviali[z]ing the debate about addiction if the concept is extended too 
far.”211 Addiction has been absorbed into the popular vernacular as a 
term meant to refer to nothing more than frequent use or enjoyable 
habits.212 The boundaries between conceptions of noncompelled 
frequent use and true addiction are easily blurred in the public eye. 
The difficulties of separating these conceptions of “addiction” arise 
because behavioral addictions involve problems of self-control, which 
are well within the dimension of normal human functioning.213 By 
contrast, true addicts experience impaired self-control at a level 
beyond what an average person might experience.214 What might seem 
to external viewers as a voluntary, and therefore blameworthy, 
activity is in fact the result of a mental disorder.215 
References, often made tongue-in-cheek, to addictions to 
shoes,216 Netflix,217 and Diet Coke218 appear to contribute to the 
marginalization of gambling addiction by creating the perception that 
 
 211. JIM ORFORD, EXCESSIVE APPETITES: A PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW OF THE ADDICTIONS 
5 (2d ed. 2001). In a broader vein, we might even encounter the argument against including 
addictions under ADA coverage—that doing so would trivialize and overextend the concept of 
disabilities. 
 212. See infra notes 216–18 and accompanying text. 
 213. MARK DICKERSON & JOHN O’CONNOR, GAMBLING AS AN ADDICTIVE BEHAVIOUR: 
IMPAIRED CONTROL, HARM MINIMISATION, TREATMENT AND PREVENTION 22 (2006); see 
FERENTZY & TURNER, supra note 80, at 39 (“It is helpful . . . to view addictions as extensions of 
normal human behaviors and aspirations—natural functions gone awry.”). 
 214. See DICKERSON & O’CONNOR, supra note 213, at 22. 
 215. Though the author was describing a narcotics user, this quote from William S. 
Burroughs’s novel Junky seems illustrative: “The question is frequently asked: Why does a man 
become a drug addict? The answer is that he usually does not intend to become an addict. You 
don’t wake up in the morning and decide to be a drug addict.” WILLIAM S. BURROUGHS, JUNKY 
4–5 (1952). 
 216. Rachel Holmes & Malgorzata Stankiewicz, Shoe Addiction, What’s the Cure?, 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 15, 2010, 6:26 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2010/apr/15/
shoe-addiction-cure. 
 217. Felice Shapiro, Confessions of a Netflix Addict, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 18, 2013, 7:52 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/felice-shapiro/netflix_b_4112820.html. 
 218. Arielle Calderon, 25 Signs You’re Addicted to Diet Coke, BUZZFEED (Apr. 30, 2013, 
3:44 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/ariellecalderon/signs-youre-addicted-to-diet-coke. 
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addictions are banal peccadilloes, rather than serious psychiatric 
disorders. This marginalization is especially disastrous to the 
credibility of behavioral addictions, which already run against the 
norm of substance-based addictions. Instead of expanding society’s 
conception of the varied types of addictions, these references would 
likely fall into what Orford would consider “too far,”219 and increase 
the risk that excessive-gambling behavior will be associated with 
overindulgences in shoes or Netflix, rather than understood as a true 
addiction. 
B. Courts’ Narrow Interpretation of the ADA 
The courts’ narrow interpretation of the ADA is widely 
acknowledged.220 Congress likely intended the ADA to incorporate 
the relevant case law developed under its predecessor, the 
Rehabilitation Act.221 This hope failed to materialize in subsequent 
court decisions.222 Instead, the Supreme Court interpreted the ADA’s 
definition of disability in a way that, according to critics, was contrary 
to the ADA’s intent.223 These cases, most notably Sutton v. United Air 
Lines, Inc.224 and Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. 
 
 219. ORFORD, supra note 211, at 5. 
 220. See Barry, supra note 55, at 206 (“In fact, the narrowing of coverage under the ADA is 
used in law schools across the country as a textbook example of how language intended by 
Congress to mean one thing can be interpreted by courts to mean something completely 
different.”). 
 221. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701–718 (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. (2015); 
see 154 CONG. REC. S18,517 (2008) (statement of Sen. Tom Harkin) (“When Congress passed 
the ADA . . . it adopted the functional definition of disability from [] Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 . . . . Within this framework, with its generous and inclusive 
definition of disability, courts treated the determination of disability as a threshold issue but 
focused primarily on whether unlawful discrimination had occurred.”). 
 222. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. (“The holdings of several Supreme Court cases sharply 
narrowed the broad scope of protection Congress originally intended under the ADA, thus 
eliminating protection for many individuals whom Congress intended to protect.”). 
 223. See, e.g., Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1815 (2005) (“This narrow construction of the 
definition of disability, commentators suggest, has contributed to plaintiffs’ low success rates in 
ADA cases, which has in turn limited the ADA’s effectiveness (particularly Title I). An 
undercurrent running through much of this scholarship is the sense among commentators that 
the judiciary is generally hostile to the ADA.” (footnote omitted)); see also NAT’L COUNCIL ON 
DISABILITY, RIGHTING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 1 (2004), available at 
http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2004/Dec12004 (“[T]he provisions of the ADA that have been 
narrowed by Court rulings currently do not provide the same scope of opportunities and 
protections expressed by those involved in the creation and passage of the ADA. Legislation is 
urgently needed to restore the ADA . . . .”). 
 224. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
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Williams,225 significantly narrowed the protections of the ADA by 
setting stringent requirements for plaintiffs alleging disability. For 
example, the Court in Sutton considerably narrowed the meaning of 
“substantially limits.”226 Recall that the ADA’s definition of disability 
requires that the claimed impairment “substantially limit” a “major 
life activity.”227 In determining the meaning of “substantially limits,” 
the Court in Sutton required a plaintiff who claimed that her disability 
substantially limited her ability to work to demonstrate that she was 
“unable to work in a broad class of jobs,” rather than demonstrate 
that her condition substantially limited her ability to work in her 
particular job.228 Two years later in Toyota Motor, in determining 
what constituted a “major life activity,” the Court limited acceptable 
activities to those “tasks that are of central importance to most 
people’s daily lives,” rather than activities specific to the life of the 
individual claiming a disability.229 In doing so, the Court held that the 
terms “substantially” and “major” “need to be interpreted strictly to 
create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled” under the 
ADA.230 
The precedents that sprouted after the ADA’s enactment 
became so restrictive that Congress sought to reopen and broaden the 
statute by passing the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) in 2008.231 
The ADAAA was intended to “reinstat[e] a broad scope of 
protection under the ADA,”232 partly by including rules of 
construction “in favor of expansive coverage to the maximum extent 
permitted by the terms of the ADA.”233 In passing the ADAAA, 
Congress forcefully rejected the Court’s holdings in Sutton and 
Toyota Motor.234 In what appears to be a targeted response to courts’ 
narrowing of the ADA’s definition of disability, the ADAAA’s 
implementing regulations included a reminder that “the primary 
object of attention [in ADA cases] should be . . . whether 
 
 225. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2001). 
 226. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491. 
 227. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2012). 
 228. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491. 
 229. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 187. 
 230. Id. at 197. 
 231. Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 
Stat. 3553 (2012) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012)). 
 232. 29 C.F.R. § 1630(c)(4) (2015).  
 233. 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. (2015). 
 234. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (2012). 
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discrimination has occurred, not whether the individual meets the 
definition of disability.”235 
The ADAAA became effective January 1, 2009,236 and the 
EEOC issued its final implementing regulations on March 25, 2011.237 
But as of the date of this Note’s publication, the results of the 
ADAAA have not proven the legislation to be an effective solution 
to the ADA’s problems, and some scholars doubt that the ADAAA 
will have any effect on court decisions.238 At the heart of this criticism 
lies a fundamental shared assumption: despite their robes, judges are 
people, and the same social attitudes that stigmatize some disabilities 
can also play a role in judges’ rulings on the bench. As one 
commentator argues: 
Attitudes to disability determined the fate of the ADA in the nearly 
twenty years between its passage and its restoration. It was largely 
attitudes—specifically, the gap between societal attitudes and the 
law’s demands—that led to the narrowing of the statute in the 
courts.239 
The continued judicial contraction of the ADA’s application to 
plaintiffs with drug addictions and alcoholism has particularly 
problematic implications for gambling addiction. Some of this narrow 
interpretation derives from the terms of the statute itself. The statute 
does not protect any individual “currently engaging in the illegal use 
of drugs.”240 But an individual successfully rehabilitated and “no 
longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs” could arguably be a 
qualified individual with a disability.241 In any case, employers are free 
 
 235. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4) (“The question of whether an individual meets the 
definition of disability under this part should not demand extensive analysis.”).  
 236. Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, § 8. 
 237. Regulations To Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act Amendments Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,977 (Mar. 25, 2011) (codified at 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630). 
 238. See, e.g., Emens, supra note 203, at 207–08 (“What will happen as more courts interpret 
it? My guess is that attitudes to disability will largely determine the courts’ interpretations. . . . I 
suspect that courts will find new ways to narrow the statute . . . .”). 
 239. Id. at 206. 
 240. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3 (2015) (“The term ‘currently engaging’ is 
not intended to be limited to the use of drugs on the day of, or within a matter of days or weeks 
before, the employment action in question. Rather, the provision is intended to apply to the 
illegal use of drugs that has occurred recently enough to indicate that the individual is actively 
engaged in such conduct.”). 
 241. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(b)(1). But see Tyson v. Or. Anesthesiology Grp., P.C., Civ. No. 03-
1192, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44992, at *19 (D. Or. June 6, 2008) (“ADA coverage [is] not 
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to prohibit their employees from using or being under the influence 
of illegal drugs and alcohol while at the workplace.242 Even in such 
narrow circumstances, courts have been reluctant to allow ADA 
claims on the basis of alcoholism and drug addictions, relying on 
extremely narrow interpretations of the ADA.243 This trend is 
particularly troublesome for individuals with gambling disorder. Even 
if gambling disorder is recognized as an allowable disability under 
Title I, courts may prove similarly hesitant to allow ADA claims in 
gambling-disorder cases by setting high bars for the plaintiff to 
establish that his or her impairment substantially limited a major life 
activity. 
C. Employer Concerns 
Some employers may resist the recognition of gambling disorder 
as a cognizable disability because it might prevent those employers 
from exercising their discretion to create safe and dependable 
workforces. After all, the ADA imposes not only negative obligations 
on employers to refrain from discriminating based on disability,244 but 
also affirmative obligations to provide reasonable accommodation in 
the workplace.245 Therefore, employers might be worried about the 
difficulty of complying with a new requirement to provide reasonable 
accommodation to gambling addicts.246 Additionally, employers may 
present various reasons against the hiring of problematic gamblers, 
including unreliability and absenteeism caused by gambling binges 
 
triggered automatically when plaintiff [is] released from his rehabilitation treatment” because 
“employers are also entitled to assurances that the employee is refraining from the continued 
illegal use of drugs and the impacts of that use.”). Even individuals whose drug-related 
disabilities qualify under this provision are subject to additional restrictions under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12114(c)(4) regarding their job performance.  
 242. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(1)–(2). 
 243. See, e.g., Shirley v. Precision Castparts Corp., 726 F.3d 675, 679 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(interpreting the ADA term “current use of drugs” to include drug use in preceding weeks and 
months); Mauerhan v. Wagner Corp., 649 F.3d 1180, 1189 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that the 
plaintiff, who had not used drugs for one month, was still a current drug user); Bailey v. Ga.-
Pac. Corp., 306 F.3d 1162, 1168−69 (1st Cir. 2002) (characterizing the plaintiff’s difficulties at 
work as “isolated problems” and rejecting his claim of alcoholism as a disability); Burch v. 
Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 315 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding that the plaintiff’s alcoholism did not 
impair any major life activity). 
 244. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012). 
 245. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
 246. See generally Carrie Griffin Basas, Back Rooms, Board Rooms—Reasonable 
Accommodation and Resistance Under the ADA, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 59 (2008) 
(advocating for the involvement of individuals with disabilities in the accommodation process). 
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and the potential of theft or embezzlement to pay off gambling 
debts.247 Finally, employers may fear that if gambling addiction is 
recognized as a disability, they might face lawsuits for refusing to 
employ individuals that they believe, based on the individuals’ 
gambling activities, might pose a high risk to the employers’ business 
interests. 
At first glance, it may seem that the ADA’s provisions offer no 
protection against these employers’ concerns. However, employers 
have a number of protections under the ADA, the best known of 
which is the “direct threat” defense, which allows employers to fire or 
refuse to hire individuals if the employers determine that the 
individuals pose a threat to workplace safety and health.248 The 
dangers facing employers of gambling addicts largely fall outside the 
“direct threat” defense, however, as they generally do not involve the 
potential for physical harm and safety hazards that the defense 
envisions.249 
Nevertheless, even if ADA cases involving gambling addiction 
are treated similarly to cases involving addictions recognized under 
ADA case law, current ADA provisions provide a potential remedy 
for many of the employers’ concerns. First, although employers may 
worry about the types of reasonable accommodation the ADA would 
mandate they provide to employees with gambling addictions, 
reasonable accommodation is restricted according to its feasibility: 
the employee’s request for accommodation must be “reasonable on 
its face.”250 Furthermore, the employee—the potential plaintiff—bears 
the burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of his or her own 
 
 247. See Todd Etshman, Employers Need To Know Warning Signs of Fraud, ROCHESTER 
BUS. J., (May 2, 2014), available at http://www.rbj.net/article.asp?aID=208286 (“The majority of 
frauds we investigate are because people have a gambling problem and steal from their 
employer to gamble.”). 
 248. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2012) (“The term ‘qualification standards’ [that an employee 
must meet] may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the 
health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.”); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) (2015) 
(same). 
 249. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2015) (“Direct Threat means a significant risk of substantial 
harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by 
reasonable accommodation . . . . In determining whether an individual would pose a direct 
threat, the factors to be considered include: (1) The duration of the risk; (2) The nature and 
severity of the potential harm; (3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) The 
imminence of the potential harm.” (emphasis in original)). 
 250. See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 402 (2002) (holding that the plaintiff 
needed to demonstrate that the accommodation “seem[ed] reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily 
or in the run of cases”). 
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request.251 In all cases, an employer is entitled to claim a defense of 
“undue hardship” when accommodation requests are too expensive 
or difficult to provide.252 This determination of undue hardship takes 
into account considerations of the employer’s size, financial 
resources, and business needs.253 Therefore, despite employers’ 
bemoaning of the difficulty of designing accommodations for 
gambling addicts, actual accommodations would most likely include 
only flexible scheduling and time off from work to participate in 
rehabilitation (as is the case for alcoholics and drug addicts in 
recovery). 
Furthermore, employers’ obligation under the ADA to provide 
reasonable accommodation has not proved especially burdensome. 
At the outset of the enforcement of the ADA, the EEOC projected 
that the reasonable-accommodation provision would create the lion’s 
share of employers’ expenses resulting from the statute.254 Still, initial 
estimates of those potential costs were quite low.255 Since then, the 
Job Accommodation Network (JAN), a service provided by the U.S. 
Department of Labor, has annually released findings on the costs and 
benefits of job accommodations under the ADA.256 In its most recent 
release, JAN reported its finding that “[m]ost employers report no 
cost or low cost for accommodating employees with disabilities.”257 
The most likely accommodations sought by gambling addicts might 
be time off from work to enter into a rehabilitation program or 
flexible scheduling to allow attendance at group-therapy meetings, 
both of which already function as reasonable accommodation for 
other addictive disorders under the ADA.258 Therefore, employers’ 
 
 251. Id. 
 252. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(B)(5)(A) (2012). 
 253. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (2012). 
 254. Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 8578, 
8582 (Feb. 28, 1991). 
 255. Id. at 8582–84 (calculating that the mean for various estimates would be $261). 
 256. For the most recent report, see generally JOB ACCOMMODATION NETWORK, 
WORKPLACE ACCOMMODATIONS: LOW COST, HIGH IMPACT (2013), available at 
http://askjan.org/media/LostCostHighImpact.doc. 
 257. Id. at 4. Of the employers providing information to JAN, 58 percent reported that the 
necessary accommodation for their employees cost nothing, and of those who did report some 
cost, the median cost of a one-time accommodation was $500. Id. 
 258. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (“The term ‘reasonable accommodation’ may include . . . 
modified work schedules . . . .”). This accommodation would be analogous to workplace 
accommodation sought by employees with other addictive disorders, like alcoholism. See 
Schmidt v. Safeway, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991, 996 (D. Or. 1994) (holding that the employer must 
provide a leave of absence for an employee to obtain medical treatment for alcoholism). 
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concerns over the burden and expense of providing accommodations 
under the ADA seem largely overstated. Furthermore, employers are 
permitted to hold employees with drug or alcohol addictions to the 
same qualification and performance standards as nonaddicts.259 It is 
therefore plausible that employees with gambling disorder could be 
placed under the same standards as other employees or potential 
employees. For example, a gambling addict who frequently misses 
work to attend horseraces or go to the casino should not be able to 
claim an exemption from workplace-attendance policies by alleging 
that his addiction caused his absences. 
Lawmakers should keep in mind, though, that employers’ stated 
concerns are not always borne out by reality. Even though individuals 
struggling with gambling addiction may have personal problems, 
these problems do not always translate into poor job performance. 
For example, in John Trammell’s case, despite the frequency of his 
habits and the severity of his casino debts, he received 
overwhelmingly positive employment reviews before his 
termination.260 Fundamentally, employers want a productive 
workforce, and even those individuals with gambling disorder, if 
given the right workplace accommodations to seek treatment, can 
ultimately become valuable employees. 
V.  WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN FOR JOHN TRAMMELL: A 
COUNTERFACTUAL CASE ANALYSIS 
In light of these suggestions and considerations, one might 
consider how John Trammell’s Title I discrimination claim might 
have played out in court if the ADA definition of disability had not 
excluded compulsive gambling. As Trammell attempted to show for 
his depression, he would have to present a prima facie case that he 
has a disability, he is a qualified individual, and he was subject to an 
adverse employment action by his employer because of his 
disability.261 
 
 259. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4) (2012); see Salley v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 977, 981 
(3d Cir. 1998) (disallowing a Title I claim in which the plaintiff claimed that he was late to work 
and left work early due to his drug use); see also Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd., 176 
F.3d 847, 856–57 (5th Cir. 1999) (suggesting factors courts can examine, “including the level of 
responsibility entrusted to the employee; the employer’s applicable job and performance 
requirements, the level of competence ordinarily required to adequately perform the task in 
question, and the employee’s past performance record” (quotation marks omitted)). 
 260. Complaint, supra note 24, at 2. 
 261. AMS. WITH DISABILITIES: PRACTICE AND COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 7:391 (2014). 
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A. Establishing a Disability 
Under the first element of his prima facie case, Trammell would 
try to characterize his gambling disorder as a mental impairment 
under § 12102(1)(A).262 Gambling disorder is diagnosable as a mental 
or psychological disorder under the DSM-5.263 Recall, however, that a 
mental impairment alone is not enough to establish a disability—the 
impairment must also “substantially limit[] one or more major life 
activities[.]”264 Trammell could conceivably make an argument that his 
gambling disorder substantially limited a number of the qualifying life 
activities listed in 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2), including sleeping, eating, 
thinking, and concentrating. This argument could have been 
supported by expert evidence from his psychiatrist, who prepared an 
affidavit attesting that Trammell’s impairment substantially limited 
major life activities because it caused “ongoing severe feelings of 
sadness, problems with insomnia, decreased appetite, decreased 
energy level, and severe anxiety regarding finances.”265 
B. Qualified Individual 
If Trammell cleared the initial hurdle of pleading a disability, he 
would next have to show he is a qualified individual—that is, “an 
individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can 
perform the essential functions” of his job.266 During his time at 
Raytheon as a senior manager,267 Trammell received overwhelmingly 
positive employment reviews before his termination.268 However, he 
had recently been confronted at work about his gambling problem 
and had been intending to ask for professional counseling at the time 
he was fired by Raytheon.269 Would seeking that treatment have 
 
 262. Although arguments could also be made for Trammell’s disability under the second 
and third prongs of the ADA’s definition of disability, because this Note has focused exclusively 
on the first prong, this hypothetical will likewise focus on how Trammell could bring his case 
under the first prong.  
 263. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. Even though Trammell was technically 
diagnosed with the definition of pathological gambling under the DSM-IV in place at the time 
of his case, this thought experiment will use the current diagnostic language and refer to 
gambling disorder. See Affidavit of Bradley R. Johnson, M.D., supra note 27, at 2 (diagnosing 
pathological gambling as a disorder). 
 264. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2012). 
 265. Affidavit of Bradley R. Johnson, M.D., supra note 27, at 2. 
 266. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2012). 
 267. Complaint, supra note 24, at 2. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Trammell v. Raytheon Missile Sys., 721 F. Supp. 2d 876, 877 (D. Ariz. 2010). 
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transformed him into a “disqualified” individual? More likely than 
not, if Trammell had sought temporary inpatient treatment for a 
gambling disorder or outpatient meetings with a psychiatrist or 
counselor, his scheduling request would have fallen under Raytheon’s 
obligation to reasonably accommodate disabled employees.270 
C. Adverse Employment Action 
Under the third element, because Raytheon fired him, Trammell 
would have little difficulty proving the occurrence of an adverse 
employment action.271 But the latter half of this element—whether he 
was fired because of his disability—would likely be the most difficult 
burden for Trammell’s prima facie case. Could Trammell prove that 
Raytheon’s decision to fire him was based on his disability? The 
advantage here, in contrast to Trammell’s real case, is that Trammell 
alleged that he informed Raytheon’s human-resources officer and 
security manager about his gambling habits.272 In fact, it was the 
human-resources officer who asked Trammell if he needed 
professional counseling.273 Raytheon’s knowledge of Trammell’s 
condition removes the major stumbling block in his depression-based 
disability claim.274 Trammell would still have to jump through all the 
hoops of the typical plaintiff bringing a Title I claim under the ADA, 
but at least in this counterfactual, he has the same chance of getting 
his foot through the courtroom door as would a similarly situated 
person with a currently cognizable disability. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the ADA provision denying Title I coverage to 
employees claiming compulsive gambling as a disability remains the 
law, the underlying reasons for this exclusion are now in doubt. 
Changing scientific understandings have shaken the foundation upon 
which scientists have defined addiction, expanding the notion of 
addiction beyond the traditional realm of substance dependencies to 
 
 270. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (“The term ‘reasonable accommodation’ may include . . . 
modified work schedules . . . .”); Schmidt v. Safeway, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991, 996 (D. Or. 1994) 
(holding that the employer must provide a leave of absence for an employee to obtain medical 
treatment for alcoholism). 
 271. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012) (“No covered entity shall discriminate against a 
qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to . . . discharge of employees . . . .”). 
 272. Trammell, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 881. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. at 882. 
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encompass behavioral dependencies as well. If not for the explicit 
exclusion contained in the ADA, gambling addiction would seem to 
fit into the definition of disability that includes alcoholism and drug 
addiction. Nevertheless, although scientific development allows for 
evolving understandings, the legal standard of disability is stymied by 
the text of the ADA. 
The recent inclusion of gambling disorder in the DSM-5 poses a 
ripe opportunity for the reevaluation of the ADA’s exclusion of 
compulsive gambling as a disability. The evolving understanding of 
addiction, the ADA’s recognized shortfalls, and the potential for 
employers to exploit loopholes caused by the exclusion of gambling 
disorder counsel in favor of such a reexamination. Amending the 
ADA would not be without challenges. Social attitudes, judicial 
resistance, and employers’ reluctance all pose potential obstacles to 
the recognition of gambling disorder as a cognizable disability under 
Title I. Given the existing statutory barrier, any change in the legal 
status of gambling disorder as a disability ultimately requires an 
amendment of the ADA that eliminates its current categorical 
exclusion. Gathering the necessary legislative momentum to act, 
however, may prove the biggest challenge of all. 
 
